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Chapter 1
General Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in the last decade, the group of the twenty most
important industry and emerging economies (G20) assigned the task to the recently
established Financial Stability Board to develop proposals of how to deal with present
and future threats in the financial sector. One important issue, that is often subject
to intense discussions, is the regulation of financial advisors’ compensation (Financial
Stability Board, 2011; Muller et al., 2014). In general, such regulatory measures aim at
providing the best possible advice for consumers. In most countries, financial advisors
are remunerated by product providers via commission payments. Concern is growing,
that this practice leads to biased advice, since in this case, the advisor has an incentive to
recommend the product related to the highest commission payment instead of the most
suitable product. Therefore, some regulators suggest, that a financial advisor should
exclusively be compensated by consumers (Financial Services Authority, 2009). Then,
the advisor has no such conflict of interest and should give unbiased advice to consumers.
Some European countries followed this idea and enacted a ban on commission payments
for many financial and insurance products.
Even though, enacting a ban on commission payments for financial and insurance
products constitutes a severe intervention in markets for financial advice, the effects of
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such a regulatory measure are barely adequate studied. The aim of this dissertation is to
derive a deeper understanding of how such an intervention affects these markets under
a key assumption of (partial) irrational consumers. In particular three academic papers
in this thesis analyze the effects of a ban on commission payments on bias in advice,
total welfare and competition between product providers.
The first paper, which is presented in chapter 2, considers the effect of a ban on com-
mission payments on the bias of advice in a theoretical model. Intuitively, advice should
not be biased, if consumers are completely rational. However, this does not constitute
a realistic assumption. Under the assumption, that in an advice process, consumers
ask for reasons and explanations, why a particular product should suit their needs, an
advisor faces transaction costs for recommending a product. These transaction costs are
considered as persuasion costs and are intuitively low for a product, which is initially
preferred by consumers, and high for a product, which is in consumers’ mind unlikely to
satisfy their needs. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how this assumption affects
the quality of advice under a fee-based remuneration system for the advisor.
Chapter 3 refers to a paper, which theoretically analyzes welfare effects of fee-based
and commission-based remuneration systems for financial advisors under the aforemen-
tioned central assumptions. In markets, where advice is essential for consumers, product
providers usually cannot sell their products directly to consumers. In these markets,
commission payments do not only serve as a compensation for the advisor, but also as a
channel for competition between product providers. As a consequence, a regulatory ban
on commission payments should be considered as a two-sided coin. On the one hand, a
ban on commission payments may reduce distortion in advice, but on the other hand, it
may restrict competition between product providers. The theoretical framework aims at
analyzing the impact of these effects on total welfare and whether one effect outweighs
the other, in order to derive reasonable policy implications for regulating financial advi-
sors’ compensation.
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The third paper is presented in chapter 4. This paper theoretically analyzes whether
and how product providers are able to compete in markets where products cannot be
sold directly to consumers and commission payments are banned by regulation. In par-
ticular, two possible channels are considered: Competition through product prices and
competition through informative advertising. If a product provider engages in informa-
tive advertising, consumers may already be familiar with certain product characteristics
before consulting an advisor. By this, advisors’ persuasion costs for the advertised prod-
uct may be lower in an advice process, which results in a higher incentive to recommend
the advertised product in comparison to other products. Put differently, informative
advertising may serve as a channel for indirect competition between product providers.
This dissertation closes with a summary of all key results and some general conclu-
sions in chapter 5
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Chapter 2
Fee for advice: a remedy for
biased product
recommendations?1
Abstract
Consumers regularly seek professional advice when purchasing financial products. It
is often argued that advisors should solely be compensated by consumers, as then, an
advisor has no incentive to give biased advice. In our theoretical model, we show, that
a fee-for-advice remuneration system does not prevent consumers from biased advice, if
they have an initial biased belief, which product best suits their needs and advisors face
transaction costs for persuading consumers.
JEL Codes: D82, D83, G20, L15
1This chapter is based on joint work with Jo¨rg Schiller from the University of Hohenheim, which is
yet unpublished. The candidates individual contribution focused mainly on the literature research, the
developing of the theoretical model, the theoretical analysis and the writing.
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2.1 Introduction
Many consumers lack intellectual or time capabilities to manage their financial decisions
and therefore seek advice when purchasing complex products, e.g. related to retirement
savings (Campbell, 2016). In general, financial advisors have superior knowledge about
available products compared to consumers and thus can judge more accurately and at
lower costs, which product best suits consumers’ needs. It is a widespread practice among
product providers to compensate financial advisors by disclosed or hidden commissions.
However, this practice enables product providers to steer advisors’ recommendation,
which consequently can be biased. It is often argued that advisors should exclusively
be compensated by consumers via a fee for advice, as then, advisors seemingly have
no incentive to recommend a certain provider’s product and to give biased advice.2
In the spirit of this view, a ban on commissions related to retail investment advice was
introduced in the United Kingdom at the end of 2012. Furthermore, in January 2013, the
Netherlands banned commissions for complex financial products including life insurance
products and mortgages.
When analyzing advantages and downsides of certain regulatory actions related to
financial advice, it is crucial to account for the specific tasks that advisors perform: For
example, advisors have to acquire general knowledge about financial concepts and avail-
able products and have to canvas consumers. For a suitable product recommendation,
both the specific situation and the needs of the consumer must be analyzed. Finally,
reasonable consumers will ask for reasons or explanations, when receiving a product
recommendation. Hence, advisors cannot simply reveal the result of their assessment on
2For example, the UK financial regulator Financial Services Authority (2009) states: “At present,
firms that give advice on investments face the prospect of earning different amounts of money depending
on which particular firm they recommend a product from and which type of product they recommend.
This creates a potential conflict of interest that can be damaging to consumers and undermine trust
in the investment industry. [...] We propose that advisor firms should only be paid for the advice and
related services that they provide through ‘advisor charges’. By this, we mean that advisor firms should
be paid by charges that are set out up-front and agreed with their clients, rather than by commissions
set by product providers to secure distribution of their products (including so-called ‘soft’ commissions,
paid in non-monetary forms).”
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the suitability of products to consumers without any further explanation. In the Eu-
ropean Union, explanations of recommendations are also mandatory for many financial
products.3
In the spirit of Mullainathan et al. (2008), we consider such transaction costs from
explaining reasons for a product recommendation as persuasion costs.4 It is costly
for the advisor to provide evident information dependent on this initial belief to the
consumer, which state that the recommended product suits the consumer’s needs. When
the advisors’ remuneration is flat (fixed fee for advice or commission) and explanations
are costly, the advisor has strong incentives to save time and therefore minimize his
variable costs. Hence, financial advisors may have incentives for biased advice even
under a fee for advice system.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the literature by the consideration of per-
suasion costs in an advice process and to analyze how these costs affect product recom-
mendations of advisors if they are exclusively compensated by consumers. To this end,
we focus on the product selection as part of an advice process. Our model consists of a
simple market for financial advice, where consumers have different needs and advisors
possess superior information about the best suiting product for individual consumers.
Advisors face transaction costs from providing consumers with relevant information and
explaining reasons for product recommendations. Consumers have a prior belief based
on common observable information about the best suiting financial product. They can
3For example, article 20 of the Insurance Distribution Directive of the European Union (2016) states:
“Where advice is provided prior to the conclusion of any specific contract, the insurance distributor
shall provide the customer with a personalised recommendation explaining why a particular product
would best meet the customer’s demands and needs.”
Additionally, the European Union (2014) Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II),
which is the framework of EU legislation for investment intermediaries that provide services to clients
around financial instruments, like shares, bonds, units in collective investment schemes and derivatives,
states in article 72:
“It is also appropriate to require investment firms to explain to their clients the reasons for the advice
provided to them.”
4Mullainathan et al. (2008) states that most persuasive messages take advantage of both transference
and framing and defines (costly) persuasion as follows: “[...] to persuade is to advertise attributes of the
product that are positively related to quality in the analogous situation.”
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either purchase a standard product based on their initial belief or consult an advisor.
The consulted advisor charges a fixed fee to the consumer and can either confirm the
consumer’s initial belief or recommend the specialized product. Recommending the spe-
cialized product is more costly for the advisor, since he has to persuade the consumer of
the specialized product contrary to his initial belief. However, the advisor faces a disutil-
ity resulting from an unsuitable product recommendation, for instance from reputational
costs and/or the fear of losing future business prospects. On the demand side, consumers
vary in their understanding of the advisor’s incentives and a therefrom potentially re-
sulting conflict of interest. Wary consumers anticipate the advisor’s tradeoff between
persuasion costs and reputational costs and consequently the quality of advice. Naive
consumers assume that advice is unbiased. On the supply side, both a monopolistic
advisor and a competitive advisor market are considered.
The main result of the analysis is, that even in the absence of commissions in the
market for financial advice, product recommendations might still be biased. Advisors
may have an incentive to confirm consumers’ incorrect beliefs if the following two condi-
tions hold: First, a consumer has an initial belief that the standard product matches his
characteristics best, but actually, the specialized product is the best fit. Second, market
discipline is low such that advisors do not have to fear sufficiently high reputational
costs from giving biased product recommendations. Our results indicate that regulation
of financial advice should not only consider advisors’ compensation but also the related
advice process. Otherwise, regulation may backfire, if it does not consider substantial
transaction costs that may distort advisors’ incentives.
In our model, advice is not just cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) and may be
biased due to persuasion costs. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) analyze biased
stock recommendations for investors and find that some investors take recommenda-
tions literally, while other investors appear to correct their purchase decision for the
bias. In this spirit, we assume wary consumers to consider a possible bias in product
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recommendations when requesting advice for a fee, whereas we assume naive consumers
not to anticipate that product recommendations might be biased. Consequently, wary
consumers have a strictly lower willingness to pay for advice in comparison to naive
consumers and ultimately have no willingness to pay for completely uninformative ad-
vice. If wary consumers’ willingness to pay for advice is sufficiently high, they always
follow the advisor’s product recommendation. Otherwise, a market for financial advice
may not exist. A similar equilibrium outcome arises for naive consumers. However, our
model indicates that naive consumers are exploited by advisors both, in a monopolistic
and a competitive advisor market. This exploitation is reduced by two factors: A high
proportion of wary consumers in the market and competition between advisors. In a
competitive advisor market, advisors face higher reputational costs due to a higher elas-
ticity in demand in comparison to a monopolistic advisor market. Consequently, wary
consumers’ willingness to pay for advice increases in the competitiveness of the advisor
market. An increase in competition between advisors also forces them to decrease the
fee, for which they can offer their advice services. Thus, consumer surplus is higher in a
competitive advisor market in comparison to a monopolistic market.
Our model extends the literature that analyzes financial intermediaries’ conflicts of
interest and incentives to give biased product recommendation in a market with horizon-
tal differentiable products. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) show that product providers
may try to influence advisors by commission payments and that mandatory disclosure
and caps on commissions may have unintended consequences. However, if consumers
perfectly anticipate the quality of advice, in equilibrium, advisors are exclusively com-
pensated by an upfront fee and give unbiased advice (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012b).
Therefore, unsophisticated consumers are a key source for biased advice and practices
of commission payments and kickbacks from product providers.
Only a few papers analyze potential problems of fee-for-advice remuneration. Grav-
elle (1993, 1994) compares a commission-based with a fee-based compensation scheme,
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where advisors face search costs, and entry into the advisor market is endogenous. He
finds that a fee-based compensation system may lead to a higher intermediation quality,
but too few consumers become informed about their best matching product. Hence, a
fee-for-advice system is not necessarily superior to a commission system once the num-
ber of advisors and overall purchases by consumers are taken into account. Focht et al.
(2013) pick up the issue of different remuneration systems in the insurance context and
find that under a fee-for-advice system, biased product recommendations may result
from side payments of product providers.
The suitability and therefore the benefit of financial products, like investments or
long-term life insurance contracts, crucially depends on the match of product features
and the individual characteristics of the consumer. Thereby, an individual consumer may
only get information about the suitability of a purchased financial product after quite
some time. Hence, financial products resemble experience goods (Nelson, 1970), or in
extreme cases, credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973). In the latter case, consumers do
not obtain any information about quality and suitability of the purchased products. The
same is valid for corresponding financial advice. Consequently, it is straightforward that
consumers’ trust in financial advice and the corresponding advisor, respectively, is a key
driving factor for the demand (Gennaioli et al., 2015). Hence, the relationship between a
consumer and an advisor is fundamentally based on the consumer’s personal beliefs and
less on objective measurements. Gennaioli et al. (2015) show, that in such a situation,
advisors have substantial incentives for giving biased product recommendations and
advisors have an incentive to pander to their consumers’ beliefs. We consider the case
of experience goods, since in our model, the advisor suffers reputational costs, when
recommending an unsuitable product.
In particular, our model is related to the real-world phenomenon observed by Mul-
lainathan et al. (2012) and Anagol et al. (2017). Their empirical findings indicate, that
advisors, irrespectively of their compensation, tend to cater to consumers’ beliefs, even
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if these are incorrect. Mullainathan et al. (2012) send trained consumers to financial
advisors to present their investment portfolios. Some of the presented portfolios were
in line with the consumers’ expressed needs and some were contrary to them. Mul-
lainathan et al. (2012) find that presented investment portfolios, which did not suit the
corresponding consumers’ needs, were often recommended by financial advisors although
changing the portfolio would result in higher commission payments. Anagol et al. (2017)
analyze advisors’ recommendations in the Indian life insurance market and find that ad-
visors confirm incorrect consumer beliefs, even if recommending a suitable product leads
to a higher compensation for the advisor. Our model confirms that such a behavior
may be rational from the advisor’s perspective. Anagol et al. (2017) and Mullainathan
et al. (2012) consider commission-based remuneration systems for financial advisors and
indicate, that there is a tradeoff between earning a high commission and minimizing
persuasion costs. This highlights, that in the absence of commission payments (which
constitute a contrary incentive to the minimization of persuasion costs), we expect the
effect of confirming consumers’ incorrect beliefs to be even more severe if advisors are
exclusively compensated by consumers via a fee for advice.
We consider transaction costs that the advisor incurs from persuading consumers that
have an initial belief about the suitability of products. In the sense of Mullainathan et al.
(2008), it is costly for the advisor to provide evident information to the consumer, which
state that the recommended product suits the consumer’s needs. Bhattacharya et al.
(2012) find, that consumers often do not respond to unbiased advice. This highlights
that information cannot be simply passed to consumers without transaction costs for
persuading consumers. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), Bertrand et al. (2010), DellaV-
igna and Gentzkow (2010) and DeMarzo et al. (2003) analyze persuasive effects across a
range of domains. Our model puts this phenomenon of persuading consumers of prod-
ucts into the context of recommending horizontal differentiable products in the absence
of commission payments.
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2.2 Basic Model
We consider a simple market for financial advice. Following Inderst and Ottaviani
(2012a) and Focht et al. (2013), this market is represented by a mass of risk neutral
consumers and a monopolistic risk neutral advisor.5 Consumers face the choice to buy
one single unit of one of two products n = A,B. The characteristics of each consumer
are reflected by an unobservable binary state variable Θ = A,B. If product n matches
the consumer’s characteristics Θ, he derives utility vh, otherwise he derives utility vl,
with vh > vl > 0. These utilities capture all discounted future cash flows dependent
on the suitability of product and consumer. We normalize the utility of not buying to
zero. Similar to Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a), the two products can reflect different
investment plans, where one of the two is more suitable than the other based on con-
sumer’s characteristics like financial conditions, tax status, or life expectancy. However,
this simple model of two products is applicable for various situations where products or
treatments do not have necessarily be originated in a financial context, for instance situ-
ations in the health care context, where different treatments yield different probabilities
for curing a specific disease.
In order to gain information about the suitability of the products, consumers have
the possibility to request a product recommendation from the advisor. We assume the
advisor to have in-depth knowledge of financial products and therefore the capability to
judge which product best suits consumers’ characteristics. Although, the advisor cannot
observe a consumer’s characteristics Θ = A,B directly, the advisor has private informa-
5The simplification of a monopolistic advisor is helpful for analyzing the interaction between con-
sumer and advisor and is also not too far from a realistic setting. The demand for advice for each single
consumer depends on many economic, social and psychological factors. In a market with multiple advi-
sors, the consumer faces considerable search costs for obtaining a second opinion by a different advisor,
which provides each advisor with some market power. Moreover, Gennaioli et al. (2015) assume that
consumers have a strong personal connection to their advisor based on trust. Therefore, consumers are
not willing to request advice from a competitor that offers advice for a marginal unit less than the initial
advisor. Thus, in our basic setup, we assume a completely nonelastic demand for advice. However, we
introduce a competitive advisor market with elastic demand for advice in section 2.7 and find that our
core results still hold in this setting.
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tion about a consumer’s characteristics denoted by q = Pr (Θ = A). Hence, he possesses
private information about the probability that product A matches a consumer’s charac-
teristics. Product A corresponds to some sort of standard product, whereas product B
corresponds to a more specialized product. This implies that product A is more likely
to match consumers’ characteristics than product B. In particular, we assume that q is
distributed over all consumers according to the distribution function G(q) with differen-
tiable density g(q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we assume that g(q)
is an increasing function of q with ∂g(q)∂q > 0 over q ∈ [0, 1], that is, g(q) is skewed to
the left. This distribution G(q) is common knowledge. Consequently, consumers have
an initial information about the suitability of the products. However, this information
is less accurate than the advisor’s private information. We specify consumers’ product
valuation with and without the advisor’s product recommendation in detail in section
2.4 and 2.5.
The advisor is offering his product recommendation for an upfront fee f . This fee is
the only compensation for the advisor and there is no option to discriminate individual
consumers by charging individual fees. In contrast to Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) and
Focht et al. (2013), we exclude the possibility, that the advisor can receive any form of
(hidden) commissions. The advisor can use his private information q and give a product
recommendation r = A,B to the consumer. However, recommending a product is costly
for the advisor, since he has to persuade the consumer of the corresponding product.
We assume that these costs are inversely proportional to the strength of consumers’
initial belief about the suitability of a product. Thus, the advisor’s persuasion costs for
product A depend on consumers’ ex ante belief according to the common information
G(q) that product B matches the respective characteristics and vice versa. In particular,
q ∈ [0, 12) and q ∈ [12 , 1] reflect probabilities, where product B and A, respectively,
matches the consumer’s characteristics with higher probability than the other product.
The corresponding probability masses are given by
∫ 1
2
0 g(q)dq and
∫ 1
1
2
g(q)dq. Hence, the
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advisor incurs persuasion costs of
cA =
(∫ 1
2
0
g(q)dq
)
k = G
(
1
2
)
k (2.1)
for recommending product A and
cB =
(∫ 1
1
2
g(q)dq
)
k =
(
1−G
(
1
2
))
k (2.2)
for recommending product B, where k > 0 denotes the marginal persuasion costs for
the advisor. Since g(q) is skewed to the left, it follows immediately that
∫ 1
2
0 g(q)dq <∫ 1
1
2
g(q)dq and therefore cA < cB holds. This implies, that it is less costly for the advisor
to persuade a consumer of the standard product A, that is suitable for the majority of
consumers, than to persuade a consumer of the specialized product B, that only matches
the characteristics of the minority. However, the advisor incurs reputational costs d > 0
when the recommended product does not match the consumer’s characteristics.6 We
relate this reputational costs to a learning effect of consumers about the suitability of
purchased products, but abstract in our analysis from specific time horizons, where this
learning effect takes place. In our basic model, the advisor’s marginal persuasion costs k,
his potential reputational costs for a wrong product recommendation d, the distribution
of the advisor’s private information G(q) and the derived utility levels vh and vl for the
consumer are exogenously given. However, we endogenize reputational costs for advisors
in section 2.7 by introducing a competitive advisor market and link reputational costs
to the degree of competition between advisors.
We differentiate in our analysis between two types of consumers. Wary consumers
are able to anticipate the fact, that the advisor’s product recommendation is driven by
persuasion costs and reputational concerns. Thus, wary consumers anticipate d and k
6Following Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a), sources of disutility for a mismatching product recommen-
dation can also be potential penalties imposed by a regulator or professional concerns for the consumer’s
well-being.
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and consequently cA and cB correctly. In contrast, we assume naive consumers to be
completely unaware of any advisor’s tradeoffs that might affect his product recommen-
dations.
We model the interaction between consumers and advisor by the following game:
At stage 1, the advisor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer f for his advice. At stage 2,
consumers decide whether to accept or to decline this offer. If the offering is accepted,
at stage 3, the advisor obtains private information represented by q and gives a product
recommendation r = A,B to the consumer based on this information. At stage 4
consumers make their final purchase decision. All players try to maximize their utilities.
Payoffs are not discounted.
2.3 Advice
Given that a consumer has accepted the advisor’s offer for a fee f , the advisor maximizes
his utility by minimizing his expected costs for giving a product recommendation. That
is, the advisor’s dominant strategy is to recommends product A whenever the expected
costs resulting from this product recommendation do not exceed those for recommending
product B and vice versa.7 In particular, the advisor recommends product A if (1 −
q)d+ cA ≤ qd+ cB holds and product B otherwise. By solving this inequality for q, we
derive a threshold q∗ for which the advisor is better off, by recommending product A if
for his private information q ≥ q∗ holds and product B otherwise, where
q∗ :=

1
2 −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d for
1
2 −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d > 0
0 for 12 −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d ≤ 0.
(2.3)
7For sake of simplicity, we assume that the advisor recommends product A in the case that expected
costs for both recommendations are equal.
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Expected costs for giving a product recommendation, dependent on q, are given by
c(q) = min {(1− q)d+ cA; qd+ cB} . (2.4)
Since g(q) is skewed to the left, it holds G
(
1
2
)
< 12 . This implies
k(1−2G( 12))
2d > 0 and
therefore
q∗ <
1
2
. (2.5)
Consequently, the advisor considers two sources of potential costs, when recommending
a product. First, costs for persuading the consumer of a certain product. Second, po-
tential reputational costs, that he might incur, if the recommended product does not
suit the consumer’s characteristics. By minimizing these two sources of costs, depen-
dent on q, equation (2.5) states, that there is a nonempty interval for q for which the
advisor’s dominant strategy is to recommends product A, even though, according to the
advisor’s private information, product B is more likely to match the consumer’s char-
acteristics. In this case the advisor is willing to incur the higher expected reputational
costs resulting from a wrong product recommendation, since he is able to compensate
this by lower persuasion costs for recommending the standard product A instead of the
specialized product B. This implies that consumers for which the private information
is q ∈ [q∗; 12) receive a biased product recommendation on purpose by the advisor. It
follows immediately that advice is only informative for q∗ > 0.
2.4 Wary consumers
Wary consumers are capable to correctly anticipate the advisor’s tradeoff between po-
tential reputational costs and persuasion costs for a certain product, when giving a
product recommendation. We solve the interaction game between consumer and ad-
visor, described in section 2.2, under the assumption, that consumers know that the
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advisor’s product recommendation is biased according to q∗ derived in equation (2.3).
The consumer’s expected utility for product A and B, dependent on q, is given by
vA(q) = q · vh + (1− q) · vl (2.6)
and
vB(q) = (1− q) · vh + q · vl, (2.7)
respectively. As a consequence, the consumer’s ex ante valuation (without any advice)
for the two products is given by
E [vA (q)] =
∫ 1
0
vA(q)g(q)dq >
∫ 1
0
vB(q)g(q)dq = E [vB (q)] > 0. (2.8)
Using backward induction, we start solving the game at stage 4. There, we have
to consider two different histories of the game: Either the consumer has accepted the
offer for advice at stage 2 or he has declined it. The purchase decision for the case
without advice is straightforward. From (2.8) it follows immediately that the consumer
purchases the standard product A. If the consumer has accepted the offer for advice at
stage 2, he received a product recommendation r = A,B at stage 3. First, we consider
the case, which corresponds to receiving product recommendation r = A. Since a wary
consumer correctly anticipates q∗, he also anticipates that this product recommendation
is equivalent to the information that q ≥ q∗ holds. Consequently, the consumer’s ex post
valuation for the two products according to the received product recommendation and
the anticipated q∗ ≥ 0 is given by
E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗] =
∫ 1
q∗
vA(q)
g(q)
1−G(q∗)dq
>
∫ 1
q∗
vB(q)
g(q)
1−G(q∗)dq = E [vB (q) | q ≥ q
∗] > 0, (2.9)
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where the strict inequality follows immediately by the skewness of g(q). The second case
corresponds to receiving product recommendation r = B. Analogous to the first case,
the consumer anticipates q < q∗. His ex post valuation for the two products is then
given by
E [vB (q) | q < q∗] =
∫ q∗
0
vB(q)
g(q)
G(q∗)
dq
>
∫ q∗
0
vA(q)
g(q)
G(q∗)
dq = E [vA (q) | q < q∗] > 0. (2.10)
Thus, in both cases, the consumer follows the advisor’s product recommendation.
At stage 3 the advisor gives his product recommendation according to section 2.3,
that is, his dominant strategy is to recommend product A if q ≥ q∗ holds, and product
B otherwise.
At stage 2 the consumer can either accept the advice offer for the fee f or remain
without advice. The expected payoff for remaining without advice is given by (2.8) with
E [vA (q)]. The expected payoff considering the information from advice (gross of fee f)
is given by
G(q∗)E [vB (q) | q < q∗] + (1−G(q∗))E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗] . (2.11)
Thus, the consumer will request advice if
f ≤ G(q∗)E [vB (q) | q < q∗] + (1−G(q∗))E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗]− E [vA (q)] (2.12)
or equivalently
f ≤ fwr = (vh − vl)
∫ q∗
0
(1− 2q) g(q)dq (2.13)
holds, where fwr denotes the wary consumer’s willingness to pay for advice, that is, the
utility difference between the payoffs with and without advice.
At stage 1 the advisor sets his fee f taking into account the consumers’ willingness to
17
pay fwr from stage 2 which constitutes an upper bound for f and his expected costs for
his advice service E [c(q)] =
∫ 1
0 c(q)g(q)dq from stage 3 which constitute a lower bound.
Proposition 2.1 There exists a unique equilibrium which depends on the consumer’s
willingness to pay for advice. If fwr ≥ E [c(q)] holds, the advisor offers his product
recommendation for f = fwr, the consumer accepts this offer and follows the advisor’s
product recommendation. In this case advice is biased, but informative (0 < q∗ < 12).
Otherwise, the consumer declines the advisor’s offer and purchases the standard product
A without advice.
Proposition 2.1 states that in equilibrium wary consumers either request advice and
consequently follow this advice, even though advice is biased in equilibrium, or remain
without advice. In the first case, the advisor creates an additional value for consumers
by providing information about the suitability of the two products and the consumer is
willing to pay exactly what this information is worth for him. However, we consider in
this setup a monopolistic advisor, which allows him to extract the whole value created
for the consumer, by charging exactly this amount to the consumer in exchange for his
information. In the second case, the information gained from the advice is not worth
paying the fee f for consumers, or in other words, the advisor’s additional value that he
creates for consumers is not covering his expected costs for creating this value and thus
the advisor is not able to extract a positive rent from consumers. This might lead to
situations, where consumers have a strictly positive willingness to pay for advice, but the
advisor’s offer is too expensive, even if the advisor offers his product recommendation
for f = E [c(q)].
Wary consumers correctly anticipate the advisor’s dominant strategy given by (2.3)
and thus can judge whether their ex ante information about the suitability of products
is sufficiently accurate so that advice is not worth paying at all for it.
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Corollary 2.2 There is a threshold G∗
(
1
2
)
:= k−d2k for the distribution of the advisor’s
private information q and if G
(
1
2
)
< G∗
(
1
2
)
holds, the consumer has no willingness
to pay for advice and purchases the standard product A. If there is a strictly positive
willingness to pay for advice, then this advice is informative, that is, q∗ > 0.
Corollary 2.2 states that it is not beneficial for consumers to request advice, if the
specialized product B is ex ante very unlikely to match the consumer’s characteristics,
that is, G
(
1
2
)
is sufficiently small. In particular, it follows immediately from Corol-
lary 2.2 that the consumer has a positive willingness to pay for advice if d > k holds,
that is, the advisor’s potential disutility from recommending an unsuitable product is
higher than the advisor’s marginal persuasion costs. If this condition is fulfilled, the
consumer anticipates, that this potential disutility d represents a sufficiently large in-
centive for the advisor to give a product recommendation, which is worth for the con-
sumer paying for. Nevertheless, the advisor’s costs for giving a product recommenda-
tion might be higher than the consumer’s willingness to pay for advice. Besides d, the
marginal persuasion costs k are a driving factor for the threshold G∗
(
1
2
)
. This thresh-
old is strictly increasing with k and limk→∞G∗
(
1
2
)
= 12 holds. Consequently, it also
holds G
(
1
2
)
< limk→∞G∗
(
1
2
)
for any left-skewed density g(q) which implies that the
consumer has no willingness to pay for advice, if the marginal persuasion costs k are
sufficiently high. In this case, k is the dominant driving factor for the advisor’s costs for
giving a product recommendation c(q). Then, the advisor will always try to minimize
his incurred persuasion costs by always recommending product A. Thus, this result is
equivalent to q∗ = 0, that is, uninformative advice. However, the exact amount, that a
consumer is willing to pay for advice is driven by various factors.
Proposition 2.3 Wary consumers’ willingness to pay for informative advice is increas-
ing with
(i) an increase of the difference of utility levels vh−vl, derived by purchasing a suitable
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and an unsuitable product, respectively.
(ii) an increase of the potential reputational costs d for recommending an unsuitable
product.
(iii) a decrease of the advisor’s marginal persuasion costs k.
(iv) an increase of the ex ante suitability of the specialized product B in the sense that
q is distributed according to a differentiable density function h(q) with h(q) > g(q)
for q ∈ (0; 12) and advice is informative for h(q).
Proposition 2.3 yields insights with regard to the driving factors for wary consumers’
willingness to pay for advice. If the utility difference between purchasing a suitable
product and purchasing an unsuitable product is increasing, informative advice becomes
more attractive. This is due to the fact, that the information gained from advice is then
getting more valuable for consumers. If the utility difference is very small, consumers
do not forgo much extra utility when purchasing an unsuitable product. The second
and third result reflect the consumers’ awareness. Since consumers anticipate the bias
in the advisor’s product recommendation, given by q∗, they anticipate that advice gets
more informative with an increase in d. In this case, the advisor has to fear higher
reputational costs for recommending unsuitable products which implies that advice gets
less biased. Consequently, the information gained from advice becomes more valuable for
consumers. Analogous, the third result indicates, that with a decrease in the advisor’s
marginal persuasion costs, the effect of compensating high reputational costs with savings
in persuasion costs is decreasing, and therefore, advice becomes also less biased. The
fourth result states, that the ex ante suitability of product B is a driving factor for
the consumers’ willingness to pay for advice. If we focus on an increase of g(q) in an
interval (q˜ − ; q˜ + ) ⊂ (0; 12) with q˜ ∈ (0; 12) and a fixed  > 0 then the increase in the
willingness to pay gets higher with bringing q˜ closer to 0. This is due to the fact, that
in the consumers’ valuation g(q) is weighted with the factor 1 − 2q. Without advice,
20
consumers purchase the standard product A. Thus, an information q which would change
their purchasing decision to purchasing the specialized product B are of high value for
consumers. In other words, an information q near the value of zero yields a higher
expected utility vB(q) and is thus more valuable for consumers than a q near the value
of one half.
Considering a total welfare perspective, in case, a market for financial advice exists
according to Proposition 2.1, the advisor’s expected costs for giving a product recommen-
dation as well as consumers’ utility derived from advice have to be taken into account.
In order to derive a welfare maximizing quality of advice q∗FB, we consider total welfare
as a continuous differentiable function of q∗ ∈ (0, 12) according to (2.3) (keeping d, k and
G fixed) which is given by
ω(q∗) = (vh − vl)
∫ q∗
0
(1− 2q) g(q)dq−
∫ q∗
0
(qd+ cB) g(q)dq−
∫ 1
q∗
((1− q)d+ cA) g(q)dq.
(2.14)
The first term of (2.14) reflects consumers’ utility derived from advice. The second
and third term, respectively, reflect the advisor’s expected costs for giving a product
recommendation for a cutoff q∗. Since fwr ≥ E [c(q)] holds, consumers’ utility from
advice, represented by fwr outweighs the advisor’s expected costs for giving a product
recommendation E [c(q)]. Thus, there exists a cutoff q∗ for which the marginal total
welfare is positive.8 However, consumers’ marginal utility at q∗ is converging to zero for
q∗ → 12 , due to
lim
q∗→ 1
2
∂fwr
∂q∗
= lim
q∗→ 1
2
∂
∂q∗
(vh − vl)
∫ q∗
0
(1− 2q) g(q)dq
= lim
q∗→ 1
2
(vh − vl) (1− 2q∗) g(q∗)
= 0. (2.15)
8The proof of Proposition 2.4 shows in detail, that this is indeed the case.
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The advisor’s marginal expected costs at q∗ → 12 are strictly positive due to
lim
q∗→ 1
2
∂
∂q∗
∫ q∗
0
(qd+ cB) g(q)dq +
∫ 1
q∗
((1− q)d+ cA) g(q)dq
= lim
q∗→ 1
2
(q∗d+ cB) g(q∗)− ((1− q∗)d+ cA) g(q∗)
= lim
q∗→ 1
2
((2q∗ − 1) d+ cB − cA) g(q∗)
= (cB − cA) g
(
1
2
)
> 0. (2.16)
Thus, continuity of total welfare as a function of q∗ implies, that there exists a sufficiently
small  > 0 such that marginal total welfare is strictly negative for q∗ ∈ (12 − , 12). As
a consequence, q∗FB is characterized by the first-order condition
∂ω(q∗)
∂q∗ = 0 and it holds
q∗FB <
1
2
. (2.17)
In this case, consumers’ marginal utility from advice equals the advisor’s marginal ex-
pected costs for giving a product recommendation. From (2.17) it follows, that com-
pletely unbiased advice is not welfare maximizing. If the advisor gives his product
recommendation according to a q∗ > q∗FB, consumers’ marginal utility from advice is
below the advisor’s marginal expected costs for giving a product recommendation. Even
though wary consumers are able to adjust their willingness to pay exactly to that amount
what advice is worth, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.1 is not welfare max-
imizing if the advisor’s offer is actually accepted or, put differently, a market for financial
advice exists.
Proposition 2.4 If there exists a market for financial advice with wary consumers
(fwr ≥ E [c(q)]), a total welfare loss arises in equilibrium (q∗ < q∗FB).
The intuition behind Proposition 2.4 is as follows. Since a market for financial advice
exists, consumers gain a sufficiently high utility from purchasing a suitable product in
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comparison to an unsuitable product. As a consequence, less biased advice results in a
higher consumers’ willingness to pay, which exceeds additional costs for the advisor for
giving a less biased product recommendation. Thus, also the advisor would be better
off by a less biased product recommendation, if he could extract this additional created
utility. However, consumers are aware of the fact, that the advisor has an incentive
to minimize his costs after receiving his upfront payment f by choosing his dominant
strategy, that is, to recommend products according to q∗. Since the advisor is not able
to credible commit to any other strategy, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition
2.1 results in a total welfare loss.
2.5 Naive consumers
We now consider that consumers are naive about the advisor’s incentives, that is, they
are not aware of the advisor’s considerations to minimize his costs which are driven by
persuasion costs for a product and a potential disutility resulting from giving a wrong
product recommendation, respectively. Thus, naive consumers assume that the advisor’s
product recommendation is unbiased. The interaction sequence for naive consumers re-
mains the same as for wary consumers, whereas the equilibrium outcome of the game
is slightly different. Now, naive consumers do not anticipate the true threshold q∗ and
therefore naively anticipate that the advisor recommends product A if q ≥ 12 holds and
product B otherwise. Keeping wary consumers’ willingness to pay for advice, character-
ized by (2.13), in mind, naive consumers will request advice if
f ≤ fnv = (vh − vl)
∫ 1
2
0
(1− 2q) g(q)dq (2.18)
holds, where fnv denotes the naive consumer’s willingness to pay for advice. From
q∗ < 12 , it follows immediately that f
nv > fwr holds.
It is straightforward, that fnv > 0 holds and naive consumers’ willingness to pay for
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advice is not affected by the advisor’s threshold q∗, in particular, if q∗ = 0 holds, this
has no effect on fnv. Thus, naive consumers have a strictly positive willingness to pay
for uninformative advice, since vh > vl and g(q) > 0 for all q ∈
[
0; 12
]
holds. The driving
factors for naive consumers’ willingness to pay are the same as for wary consumers in
Proposition 2.3 except for persuasion costs and reputational costs for the advisor which
are not anticipated by naive consumers. This result is in line with the assumption, that
naive consumers do not anticipate that the advisor’s product recommendation is biased
and thus expect always a positive utility surplus from the advisor’s information.
Proposition 2.5 There exists a unique equilibrium which depends on the naive con-
sumer’s willingness to pay for advice. If fnv ≥ E [c(q)] holds, the advisor offers his
product recommendation for f = fnv, the naive consumer accepts this offer and follows
the advisor’s product recommendation. In this case, advice is biased and not necessarily
informative, that is, 0 ≤ q∗ < 12 . Otherwise, the naive consumer declines the advisor’s
offer and purchases the standard product A without advice.
Analogous to Proposition 2.1 which relates to wary consumers, Proposition 2.5 states,
that in equilibrium either the naive consumer requests advice and consequently follows
this advice or remains without advice. In the latter case, the information gained from
advice is not worth paying the fee f from the consumer’s perspective, even though this
information is erroneously valued too high due to the naive expectation, that advice is
unbiased. Furthermore, there might also be constellations for naive consumers, where
the consumer has a strictly positive willingness to pay for advice, but the advisor’s offer
is too expensive, even if the advisor offers his product recommendation for f = E [c(q)].
In comparison to the scenario with wary consumers, the advisor extracts a strictly higher
rent from naive consumers, in particular
fnv − fwr = (vh − vl)
∫ 1
2
q∗
(1− 2q) g(q)dq > 0. (2.19)
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A total welfare loss arises in equilibrium, if naive consumers accept the advisor’s offer.
If the advisor’s expected costs for giving a product recommendation exceeds consumer’s
additional utility through advice, a total welfare loss is obvious. In the other case, a
total welfare loss is constituted by Proposition 2.4. Then, the naive consumers’ higher
willingness to pay for advice in comparison to wary consumers’ willingness to pay for
advice constitutes a shift of wealth from consumers to the advisors, but does not affect
total welfare.
2.6 Heterogeneous consumers
The analysis in the two previous sections is limited to the case, where the advisor directly
observes whether he faces a market with only wary consumers or a market with naive
consumers. We now consider a market with a fraction Φ ∈ (0, 1) of wary consumers
and a fraction of 1 − Φ of naive consumers. In this case, the advisor does not observe
the consumer’s behavioral type and therefore cannot directly price discriminate the two
types. We assume that participation constraints fwr ≥ E [c(q)] and fnv ≥ E [c(q)] for
both consumer types are satisfied.9 The equilibrium is then characterized as follows.
Proposition 2.6 There exists a threshold Φ∗ = 1 − fwrfnv > 0. If Φ ≥ Φ∗ holds, the ad-
visor offers his product recommendation for f = fwr. In this case both consumer types
request advice and follow the advisor’s product recommendation. Otherwise, the advisor
sets his fee f = fnv. Then only naive consumers will request advice and consequently fol-
low the advisor’s product recommendation whereas wary consumers will remain without
advice and purchase the standard product A. In both cases there arises a total welfare
loss in equilibrium, whereby this loss is strictly higher in the latter case.
9If fwr and fnv are below the advisor’s expected costs E [c(q)] for recommending a product, then
both types remain without advice and purchase the standard product A. If fnv > E [c(q)] > fwr holds,
the advisor offers his product recommendation for f = fnv which implies that only naive consumers
will request advice and consequently will follow the advisor’s product recommendation whereas wary
consumers will remain without advice.
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As a result, a sufficiently large fraction of wary consumers protect naive consumers
from exploitation. In this case, the advisor is better off by always offering his advice for
f = fwr. However, if the fraction of wary consumers is sufficiently small, the advisor
will set his fee at f = fnv and consequently none of the wary consumers will accept
this offer. Naive consumers are exploited, since wary consumers cannot protect them
from paying the higher fee f = fnv to the advisor. Furthermore, there arises a strictly
higher total welfare loss if only naive consumers request advice, since fwr −E [c(q)] > 0
holds. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, wary consumers remain without advice due to a
lower willingness to pay in comparison to naive consumers.10
2.7 Competition
In this section we extend our model of section 2.4 and 2.5 by introducing an elastic
demand function which allows us to capture different degrees of competition. In the
previous sections, the advisor’s potential disutility is determined exogenously. However,
introducing an elastic demand function also allows us to endogenize the advisor’s po-
tential reputational costs. Similar to Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) we abstract from
institutional details of particular financial markets and consider a simple model, where
two advisors i = 1, 2 compete for one type of consumers. Both advisors have individual
marginal persuasion costs ki which depend on advisor i’s characteristics and might also
incur different potential reputational costs di because of different professional concerns
or different fear of losing future business prospects. For convenience, we assume that
none of the two has a substantial advantage in di and ki in the sense that none of the two
advisors is able to push his competitor out of the market, that is, there are nonempty
sets Qi ⊂ [0, 1] for which advisor i = 1, 2 is weakly more cost efficient for giving a prod-
10Our model does not account for different levels of wealth for consumers and a possible resulting
difference in the willingness to pay for advice. However, these differences may lead to a clustering within
consumers, where some of them are provided with advice in equilibrium and others do not request advice.
See Gravelle (1994) for an analysis of such advice gaps.
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uct recommendation than his competitor. According to (2.4), the corresponding advisor
i’s expected minimized costs for giving a product recommendation, dependent on q, are
given by
ci(q) = min
{
(1− q)di +G
(
1
2
)
ki; qdi +
(
1−G
(
1
2
))
ki
}
. (2.20)
Both advisors offer a certain utility gained from the respective advice
uˆi = (vh − vl)
∫ q∗i
0
(1− 2q) g(q)dq − fi, (2.21)
where q∗i is defined according to (2.3) with di and ki, respectively, and fi denotes the
fee charged by advisor i for his product recommendation. Equation (2.21) applies for
both, wary and naive consumers. Wary consumers anticipate q∗i correctly, whereas naive
consumers anticipate q∗i =
1
2 .
For sake of simplicity, we assume a representative consumer for every q ∈ [0, 1] for
which the advisors compete. Each representative consumer represents a sufficiently large
group of homogenous consumers. Consequently, the representative consumer can split
up his consumption of advice, since within a group, each single consumer can decide from
whom he will take advice and therefore, some can take advice from advisor 1 and some
can take advice from advisor 2. In line with Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b), we assume
a symmetric and continuously differentiable demand function xi = x (uˆi, uˆj) with i 6= j
and ∂x∂uˆi > 0 and
∂x
∂uˆj
< 0 for x(·) > 0. Thus, demand for advisor i’s service increases
with an increase in uˆi and decreases with an increase in uˆj , for i 6= j.
The corresponding profit for advisor i, dependent on q, is then given by
Πθ (uˆi, q)x (uˆi, uˆj) =
(
fθi − ci(q)
)
x (uˆi, uˆj) (2.22)
where θ = {wr, nv}.
Each advisor i = 1, 2 chooses his promised utility uˆi in order to maximize (2.22).
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Thus, best response functions are given by the first order condition
∂Πθ (uˆi, q)
∂uˆi
x (uˆi, uˆj) + Π
θ (uˆi, q)
∂x (uˆi, uˆj)
∂uˆi
= 0. (2.23)
For convenience we assume that best response functions intersect once and hence yield
a unique equilibrium.
As mentioned in section 2.2 consumers might face considerable search costs for ob-
taining a second opinion or have a strong personal connection to a certain advisor based
on trust. However, this assertion does not hold for every consumer within the group.
Thus, we assume the representative consumer’s demand function xi as non perfectly
elastic and capture the degree of competition by the elasticity
η (uˆi) =
∂x (uˆi, uˆj)
∂uˆi
· uˆi
x (uˆi, uˆj)
> 0. (2.24)
An increase in competition is then captured by an increase in elasticity everywhere. The
first order condition (2.23) is then given by
Πθ (uˆi, q) =
−∂Πθ(uˆi,q)∂uˆi uˆi
η (uˆi)
. (2.25)
If competition between advisors increases, that is, the demand function xi gets more
elastic, also the fear of losing future business prospects increases, since in this case
it is more likely that consumers will request advice from the competitor. Thus, we
assume that di (η (uˆi)) is a bounded function which is strictly increasing with η (uˆi).
Consequently, competition yields to a higher quality of advice, in the sense, that the
threshold q∗i increases with an increase in competition. Furthermore, higher quality
of advice goes in hand with higher expected costs for recommending a product. Thus,
competition can be seen as a sort of disciplining measure, since advisors are forced to give
a more elaborated product recommendation. By assumption, none of the competitors
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can be pushed out of the market. Hence, the upper bound of di (η (uˆi)) satisfies
fθi ≥ E [ci(q)]
= E
[
min
{
(1− q)di (η (uˆi)) +G
(
1
2
)
ki; qdi (η (uˆi)) +
(
1−G
(
1
2
))
ki
}]
. (2.26)
This assumption guarantees, that the pressure resulting from competition on the maxi-
mum chargeable fee for the advisors does not result in not providing advice for consumers
at all.
Proposition 2.7 Wary consumers’ willingness to pay for advice is increasing with an
increase in competition, whereas the potential exploitation of naive consumers is decreas-
ing. An increase in competition also yields a higher consumer surplus for both types of
consumers.
Proposition 2.7 shows that from the consumers’ perspective there are two advantages
that are derived from competition between advisors. First, the quality of a product
recommendation is strictly higher in this scenario in comparison to the case without
competition. Wary consumers anticipate the higher quality and adapt their willingness
to pay for advice. Naive consumers do not anticipate the higher quality, but are exploited
less, since real quality of advice and erroneous belief of the advisor’s quality converge.
Second, advisors are forced to offer their product recommendation for a strictly lower
fee in the presence of competition, which yields a higher consumer surplus if advice is
requested.
2.8 Conclusions
This article provides a theoretical analysis of incentives for financial advisors to give
biased product recommendations in the absence of any form of commission payments.
To this end, we show that in some situations advisors have an incentive to recommend
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unsuitable products to their consumers due to the existence of persuasion costs. This is
the case, when consumers have some initial belief, which product suits best their needs
and advisors do not have to fear high reputational costs. We consider wary consumers,
who are able to anticipate biased product recommendations and naive consumers who
expect unbiased advice, if advisors are only compensated by an upfront fee. Our model
shows, that advisors have an incentive to exploit naive consumers. Nevertheless, in both
scenarios there arises a total welfare loss in equilibrium. The presence of wary consumers
may prevent naive consumers from exploitation. Furthermore, an increase in competition
between advisors results in less biased product recommendations and consequently in a
higher consumer surplus. Our results suggest that financial regulators should be careful,
when enacting a ban on commissions for financial advice. Fee for advice is not a remedy
for biased product recommendations.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. In the first case, it holds fwr ≥ f ≥ E [c(q)]. From (2.13)
it follows, that the consumer will request advice. Consequently, at stage 4, the con-
sumer will follow the advisor’s product recommendation, according to (2.9) and (2.10).
At stage 3, according to (2.3) the advisor is recommending product A if q ≥ q∗ and
product B otherwise. As mentioned, at stage 2 the consumer will request advice and
at stage 1 the advisor maximizes his utility by offering his advice for f = fwr. From
(2.5) it follows that advice is biased. From fwr ≥ E [c(q)] > 0 it follows that there
is a strictly positive willingness to pay for advice. Since vh − vl > 0 holds, this is
equivalent to
∫ q∗
0 (1− 2q) g(q)dq > 0. By assumption, it holds g(q) > 0 over q ∈ [0, 1]
and by (2.5) it holds q∗ < 12 . This implies (1− 2q) g(q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0; q∗]. Thus,∫ q∗
0 (1− 2q) g(q)dq > 0 holds if and only if q∗ > 0. The second case, fwr < E [c(q)]
implies that no advice is requested at stage 2. Thus, at stage 4, the consumer purchases
product A according to (2.8). Stage 3 is skipped, since at stage 1 the advisor can only
offer his product recommendation for f = E [c(q)] > fwr.
Proof of Corollary 2.2. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2.1, no willingness
to pay for advice is equivalent to
∫ q∗
0 (1− 2q) g(q)dq ≤ 0 which holds if and only if q∗ = 0.
From (2.3) it follows that this is equivalent to 12 −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d ≤ 0 or G
(
1
2
) ≤ k−d2k . The
purchase decision is given by (2.8). A strictly positive willingness to pay is equivalent to∫ q∗
0 (1− 2q) g(q)dq > 0. In line with the previous considerations this holds if and only if
q∗ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Since advice is informative, it holds 0 < q∗ < 12 .
(i) From (2.13) it follows ∂f
wr
∂(vh−vl) =
∫ q∗
0 (1− 2q) g(q)dq > 0.
(ii) From (2.13) it follows ∂f
wr
∂d = (vh − vl)
k(1−2G( 12))
4d (1− 2q∗)g(q∗) > 0.
(iii) From (2.13) it follows ∂f
wr
∂k = (vh − vl)
(
−(1−2G(
1
2))
2d (1− 2q∗)g(q∗)
)
< 0.
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(iv) Let q∗h =
1
2 −
k(1−2H( 12))
2d . Since advice is informative for h(q), it holds q
∗
h >
0. From h(q) > g(q) for q ∈ (0; 12) it follows (1 − 2q)h(q) > (1 − 2q)g(q) for
q ∈ (0; 12) and H (12) > G (12). Therefore, it holds (vh − vl) ∫ q∗h0 (1− 2q)h(q)dq >
(vh − vl)
∫ q∗
0 (1− 2q) g(q)dq.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. If a market for financial advice exists, Proposition 2.1
states, that advice is informative, that is, 0 < q∗ < 12 holds. Let  ∈
(
0; 12 − q∗
)
and
we assume the advisor to give a less biased product recommendation in the sense, that
the interval q ∈ [q∗; 12) for which the advisor gives a wrong product recommendation on
purpose is shrunk to q ∈ [q∗ + ; 12). Consumer surplus resulting from this is given by
CS() = (vh − vl)
∫ q∗+
q∗
(1− 2q) g(q)dq. (2.27)
However, the advisor incurs additional persuasion costs for recommending the suitable
product, that is, the specialized product B instead of the standard product A, and lowers
his potential reputational costs for recommending an unsuitable product, given by
AC() =
∫ q∗+
q∗
(qd+ cB − (1− q)d− cA) g(q)dq (2.28)
= d
∫ q∗+
q∗
(2q − 1) g(q)dq +
∫ q∗+
q∗
(cB − cA) g(q)dq (2.29)
= −d
∫ q∗+
q∗
(1− 2q) g(q)dq + [G (q∗ + )−G (q∗)]
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k, (2.30)
where AC() > 0 holds, since for q > q∗ the advisor’s costs are strictly lower for recom-
32
mending product A due to (2.3). The change in total welfare is given by
ω() = CS()−AC() (2.31)
= [(vh − vl) + d]
∫ q∗+
q∗
(1− 2q) g(q)dq − [G (q∗ + )−G (q∗)]
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k.
(2.32)
Taking the partial derivative with respect to  yields
∂ω()
∂
= [(vh − vl) + d] (1− 2(q∗ + )) g(q∗ + )− g(q∗ + )
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k. (2.33)
If ∂ω()∂ > 0 holds, total welfare increases with , which implies that the equilibrium
characterized in Proposition 2.1 is not welfare maximizing. Using (2.3), it holds
∂ω()
∂
> 0 (2.34)
⇔ [(vh − vl) + d] (1− 2(q∗ + ))−
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k > 0 (2.35)
⇔ [(vh − vl) + d] (1− 2) + [(vh − vl) + d] (−2q∗) >
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k (2.36)
⇔− 2q∗ > −(1− 2) +
(
1− 2G (12)) k
(vh − vl) + d (2.37)
⇔q∗ < 1− 2
2
−
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2(vh − vl) + 2d (2.38)
⇔1
2
−
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2d
<
1− 2
2
−
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2(vh − vl) + 2d (2.39)
Since vh − vl > 0 holds, it follows
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2d
>
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2(vh − vl) + 2d. (2.40)
Consequently, there always exists a sufficiently small  > 0 such that (2.39) holds.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5. In the first case, it holds fnv ≥ f ≥ E [c(q)]. From
(2.18) it follows, that the consumer will request advice. Consequently, at stage 4, the
consumer will follow the advisor’s product recommendation, analogous to wary con-
sumers. At stage 3, according (2.3) the advisor is recommending product A if q ≥ q∗
and product B otherwise. As mentioned, at stage 2 the consumer will request advice
and at stage 1 the advisor maximizes his utility by offering his advice for f = fnv. Since
f ≥ E [c(q)] > 0 there is a strictly positive willingness to pay for advice. From (2.5)
and (2.18) it follows 0 ≤ q∗ < 12 . The second case, fnv < E [c(q)] implies that no advice
is requested at stage 2. Thus, at stage 4, the consumer purchases product A according
to (2.8). Stage 3 is skipped, since at stage 1 the advisor can only offer his product
recommendation for f = E [c(q)] > fnv.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Since fnv > fwr holds, both consumer types will
request advice for f = fwr. Thus, the expected payoff for the advisor is then Φfwr +
(1− Φ) fwr = fwr. Wary consumers are not willing to pay fnv for advice. Consequently,
the expected payoff for the advisor, when setting f = fnv is (1− Φ) fnv. From this
considerations, it follows, that the advisor will set f = fwr if fwr ≥ (1− Φ) fnv or
Φ ≥ 1 − fwrfnv > 0. If both consumer types request advice, a total welfare loss follows
immediately from Proposition 2.4. If Φ < Φ∗ holds, only naive consumers request advice.
Thus, the total welfare loss increases by Φ (fwr − E [c(q)]) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. By assumption, it holds that di (η (uˆi)) is a strictly
increasing function of η (uˆi). Consequently, q
∗
i =
1
2−
k(1−2G( 12))
2di(η(uˆi))
is also strictly increasing
with η (uˆi). Thus, the first assertion follows from Proposition 2.3. With an increase of
q∗i , the difference between the naive belief and the true threshold
1
2 − q∗i is shrinking.
Therefore, the difference between the naive consumers’ willingness to pay for advice and
the wary consumer’s willingness to pay for advice fnvi − f rti =
∫ 1
2
q∗i
(1− 2q) g(q)dq is also
shrinking with an increase of q∗i . Thus, the second assertion holds. Obviously, it holds
∂Πθ(uˆi,q)
∂uˆi
< 0, since from (2.21) it follows, that for a given threshold q∗i this can only
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be done by lowering the fee, that is charged to consumers. Therefore, equation (2.25)
yields, that Πθ (uˆi, q) is decreasing with an increase in η (uˆi) which leads consequently
to a higher consumer surplus.
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Chapter 3
Consumer persuasion and
remuneration of financial
advisors11
Abstract
Many consumers rely on professional advisors when purchasing financial products. We
compare fee-based and commission-based remuneration systems for financial advisors
from a total welfare perspective in a theoretical model, where advisors face transac-
tion costs from persuading consumers of a recommended product and consumers have
an initial prior belief about their best suitable product. We show, that total welfare
is higher under a commission-based remuneration system in comparison to a fee-based
remuneration system, if the magnitudes of commission payments for different products
are sufficiently close to each other.
JEL Codes: D18, D21, D43, G28
11The following chapter is a single authored manuscript by the candidate and yet unpublished.
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3.1 Introduction
Consumers regularly seek advice when purchasing complex products, especially in the
financial sector. However, product recommendations of financial advisors can be bi-
ased. This potential bias is often related to the compensation structure of financial
advisors. Usually, financial advisors receive commission payments by product providers
and thus might give advice in favor of product providers which offer the highest com-
mission payment. Intuitively, regulators should easily solve this problem by changing
the compensation structure by law towards a fee-based system, where consumers have
to pay an upfront fee for advice services and commission payments by product providers
are banned. In Europe, some countries followed this idea and established a fee-based
compensation system for many financial products in order to protect consumers from
biased advice.12
This paper contributes to the literature by questioning this intuitive superiority of
a fee-based remuneration system for financial advisors in comparison to a commission-
based remuneration system. To this end, we consider a total welfare perspective for both
remuneration systems in a setting, where advisors face transaction costs for persuading
consumers of a product dependent on consumers’ initial belief about the suitability
of available products. In the spirit of Mullainathan et al. (2008), these transaction
costs result from stating reasons and explanations why a particular product should suit
consumers’ needs.13 In the presence of such persuasion costs, advice is biased under a
fee-based remuneration system if market shares of product providers are not equally sized
(Schiller and Weinert, 2018). We modify the model of Schiller and Weinert (2018) in
order to answer the following question: In the presence of persuasion costs for advisors,
which remuneration system leads to a higher bias in advice and which remuneration
12For example, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom implemented such fee-based compensation
systems and corresponding bans of commission payments for many products like mortgages, investment
products, insurance products and consumers credits.
13Mullainathan et al. (2008) defines persuasion as follows: “[...] to persuade is to advertise attributes
of the product that are positively related to quality in the analogous situation.”
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system leads to a higher total welfare?
Our model consists of a market for financial advice with the following participants: A
standard product provider A, a specialized product provider B, a mass of consumers and
one monopolistic advisor. Both product providers face equal production costs and offer
one corresponding product for a price pA and pB, respectively. Consumers face the choice
of whether to purchase one of the two products or not. Consumers’ needs are horizontal
differentiated and can be satisfied by either the standard product or the specialized prod-
uct. According to the common prior belief, the standard product matches consumers’
needs with strictly higher probability than the specialized product, but consumers have
the possibility to consult the advisor, who possesses superior private information about
the suitability of the two products. We consider two model settings: Either the advisor
charges an upfront fee to consumers for his product recommendation or the advisor is
compensated through commission payments by product providers for respective sales. If
the advisor is consulted, he faces two sources of costs: Persuasion costs for the two prod-
ucts dependent on the common prior belief and potential reputational costs subsequently
of an unsuitable product recommendation. Persuasion costs are inversely proportional
to the common prior match probability of products and needs. Hence, persuasion costs
for the standard product are strictly lower than those of the specialized product. In the
fee-based remuneration setting, product providers may only compete through product
prices, whereas in the commission-based setting, they also have the possibility to steer
the advisor’s product recommendation by raising their commission payments and thus
engage in an indirect competition.
Our main result is, that in the presence of persuasion costs and a strictly higher
match probability of the standard product with consumers’ needs in comparison to the
specialized product, a commission-based remuneration system for the advisor, where
commission payments of both product providers do not differ too much in height, leads
to a higher total welfare than the fee-based remuneration system. Under the assumption,
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that advice is essential for consumers, in the sense, that consumers’ product valuation ac-
cording to their prior (common) information are below production costs and the advisor
faces strictly lower persuasion costs for the standard product in comparison to the spe-
cialized product, a fee-based remuneration system leads to the following results: Either
no market for financial advice exists due to the poor quality of advice and consequently
no products are sold or otherwise, advice is sufficiently informative and consequently a
market for financial advice exists. In the latter case, advice is biased in equilibrium, in
favor of the standard product provider A and product providers are not able to attract
consumers away from their competitor by lowering their product prices. Thus, the spe-
cialized product provider possesses an inefficiently low market share and the standard
product provider an inefficiently high market share.
In equilibrium, where products are sold under a commission-based remuneration
system, the specialized product provider’s commission payment for a sold product is
strictly higher in comparison to the standard product provider’s commission payment
due to different incentives resulting from (ex ante) uneven market shares. If the dif-
ference in commission payments is below a threshold, total welfare is strictly higher
under a commission-based remuneration system in comparison to a fee-based remunera-
tion system (and vice versa). In this case, the advisor’s aggregated persuasion costs are
higher in comparison to the fee-based scenario, but more consumers are matched with
their most suitable product. This additional created value due to less biased advice and
corresponding lower reputational costs outweigh the higher aggregated persuasion costs
for the advisor and thus positively affects total welfare.
We consider products on a line between credence goods, where consumers cannot
learn even after purchasing a product, whether the products suit their needs or not
(Darby and Karni, 1973; Emons, 1997), and experience goods, where such a learning
effect is possible after some time (Nelson, 1970). In our model, we can capture such
different learning effects by different reputational costs. Thus, our model is applicable
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to various situation of markets in between experience goods and credence goods. Fur-
thermore, we consider transaction costs for giving a product recommendation, since in
our model, the advisor has to persuade his consumers of the recommended product.
These persuasion costs arise due to the assumption, that consumers demand for reasons
and explanations, why a particular product should suit their needs (Schiller and Wein-
ert, 2018).14 The existence of such persuasion costs are related to various consumers’
irrationalities like limited knowledge or a lack of intellectual capacity to perfectly pro-
cess any amount of information (Chater et al., 2010; Inderst, 2011; Campbell, 2016).
Then, advice is not cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) due to the costly information
transmission to consumers in the advice process. In our model, persuasion costs for a
product are inversely proportional to the strength of consumers’ initial (common prior)
belief about the suitability of this product. This constitutes an analogy to Gentzkow
and Kamenica (2014), who also considered such a costly persuasion process for advi-
sors. As an extension of their basic model of persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) assume that the advisor is endowed with perfect
commitment power to any advice quality. In contrast, we assume, that the quality of
advice is driven by exogenous factors, such as potential reputational costs, persuasion
costs and the prior common information about the suitability of products and resulting
(dominant) strategies for the advisor. Especially, we implicitly assume, that the advisor
cannot credible commit to any dominated strategy.
Mullainathan et al. (2012) and Anagol et al. (2017) find empirical evidence that
indicates the existence of aforementioned transaction costs from persuading consumers
of a product. In a field experiment, they sent trained consumers to financial advisors,
who should express their needs, which sometimes were in line with their initial prior
belief and sometimes were contrary to it. Mullainathan et al. (2012) and Anagol et al.
(2017) find that advisors tend to confirm consumers’ prior beliefs, even if the expressed
14In the European Union, such explanations are also mandatory for many financial products (Euro-
pean Union, 2014) and insurance products (European Union, 2016).
40
needs were contrary to them and recommending the best suitable product would result
in a higher compensation for the advisor. Gennaioli et al. (2015) picked up this issue
and identified in a theoretical model, that trust between consumers and advisors is the
primary driving factor for requesting advice. In their model, confirming a consumer’s
belief generates trust, hence, they find, that advisors have an incentive to cater to
consumers’ incorrect beliefs and as a consequence give biased advice.
We are interested in a theoretical comparison of total welfare under a fee-based and a
commission-based remuneration system if the advisor faces persuasion costs in an advice
process due to partial irrational consumers. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
other literature which considered this issue. However, under the assumption of com-
pletely rational consumers, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) show in a theoretical model,
that a fee-based remuneration system is superior to a commission-based remuneration
system from a total welfare perspective. This result is driven by the assumption of
costless information transmission from the advisor to the consumer and the assumption
that consumers are capable to anticipate a potential bias in advice due to commission
payments. The latter assumption results in a need for product providers to signal no
distortion in the advice process by setting a product price equal to production costs.
As a consequence, product providers cannot compensate the advisor through positive
commission payments and thus, consumers pay an upfront fee for the advisor’s product
recommendation.
In an early contribution Gravelle (1993, 1994) compares in a theoretical model fee-
based and commission-based remuneration systems for advisors in the context of insur-
ance markets. In contrast to our model, advisors do not face persuasion costs, but it is
costly for the advisor to contact a consumer. Although a fee-based remuneration system
might lead to a higher quality of advice in his theoretical framework, less consumers
request advice for an upfront fee and consequently do not purchase a suitable prod-
uct in comparison to the case, where the advisor is compensated through commission
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payments by product providers. Considering the overall number of product purchases,
Gravelle (1993, 1994) argues, that a fee-based remuneration system is not superior to
a commission-based system from a total welfare perspective. Focht et al. (2013) also
compare in a theoretical model fee-based and commission-based remuneration systems
in an insurance context. Their results indicate, that the remuneration system does not
affect total welfare, as long as the advisor acts completely nonstrategic and, moreover,
as long as efficient side contracting is possible. However, they argue, that illegal side
contracting may lead to inefficiencies under a fee-based remuneration system and hence
to a lower total welfare. Hofmann and Nell (2011) argue, that a fee-based remuneration
system always leads to a higher total welfare, if a fraction of consumers face strictly
lower search costs for a suitable product than an advisor. Then, these fraction of con-
sumers do not request advice if the advisor charges an upfront fee. However, under a
commission-based remuneration system all consumers will request advice, which leads
to higher aggregated search costs in the market.
3.2 Fee for advice
3.2.1 Model
For sake of simplicity, we start with a benchmark scenario, where commission payments
are effectively banned by regulation. To this end, we modify the model of Schiller and
Weinert (2018) which is based on Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a). Our model consists
of a market for financial advice with the following risk neutral, utility maximizing par-
ticipants: Two product providers i = A,B, a monopolistic advisor and a mass of one
consumer. Product provider i offers a corresponding product i for a price pi. Produc-
tion costs for both product providers are given by γ > 0.15 Consumers have to decide
15Financial products are usually immaterial goods, so that the corresponding production costs mainly
consist of administrative costs which can be seen as exogenously given for both product providers for
example due to third party IT-systems and wages for employees.
42
whether to buy one single unit of product A or B. Their needs are characterized by
a binary state variable Θ = A,B which is unobservable for all parties. If a product
matches a consumer’s needs, he derives a high utility vh and otherwise a low utility vl,
where vh > vl > 0 holds. The utility of not buying a product is normalized to zero. We
abstract from further specific product characteristics and from different time horizons,
where utilities are realized, so that our model is applicable to various situations in a
financial and non-financial context.
The advisor possesses private information about the probability that product A best
suits a consumer’s needs, denoted by q = Pr(Θ = A), and, accordingly, that product B
best suits a consumer’s needs with probability 1−q. The individual q for each consumer
is not observable by the other parties, however, the distribution of the advisor’s private
information G(q) with upward sloping linear density g(q) > 0 for q ∈ [0, 1] is common
knowledge. This allows us to capture different market structures and corresponding
match probabilities for both products, where product A refers to the product, that
matches consumers’ needs with higher probability than product B. Hence, we consider
product A as a standard product and product B as a specialized product.
Consumers’ product valuation, dependent on q, is given by
vA(q) = q · vh + (1− q) · vl (3.1)
for product A and by
vB(q) = (1− q) · vh + q · vl, (3.2)
for product B, respectively. We assume that consumers’ ex ante product valuation ac-
cording to the common information G(q) for the standard product A is below production
costs, i.e. that
E [vA (q)] =
∫ 1
0
vA(q)g(q)dq < γ (3.3)
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holds. Since g(q) is an upward sloping linear density, this also implies an ex ante prod-
uct valuation for the specialized product B below production costs, i.e. E [vB (q)] =∫ 1
0 vB(q)g(q)dq < γ. Assumption (3.3) guarantees, that consumers derive negative util-
ity from purchasing a product for a price which equals at least production costs without
any further information in addition to the common knowledge G(q). Implicitly, assump-
tion (3.3) also guarantees, that product providers cannot sell their products directly
to consumers. In order to get further information about the suitability of products,
consumers can request advice from the monopolistic advisor, who offers his product
recommendation service for an upfront fee f .
In line with Schiller and Weinert (2018), we consider transaction costs for giving a
product recommendation which results from persuading consumers of the corresponding
product. Thereby, these persuasion costs for a product are inversely proportional to the
strength of consumers’ belief about the suitability of this product which is based on the
common information G(q). In particular, we assume that the advisor incurs persuasion
costs of
cA =
(∫ 1
2
0
g(q)dq
)
k = G
(
1
2
)
k (3.4)
for the standard product A and
cB =
(∫ 1
1
2
g(q)dq
)
k =
(
1−G
(
1
2
))
k (3.5)
for the specialized product B, where k > 0 denotes the advisor’s marginal persuasion
costs. Due to the upward sloping density g(q) it follows immediately, that it is less costly
for the advisor to recommend the standard product A in comparison to the specialized
product B. However, we assume, that the advisor incurs reputational costs d > 0 for
recommending an unsuitable product to consumers. We assume the advisor’s marginal
persuasion costs k, as well as potential reputational costs d to be common knowledge.
The game sequence for our benchmark model is characterized in the following way:
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At stage 1, product providers simultaneously set their product prices pA and pB. At
stage 2, the advisor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer f for his product recommendation.
At stage 3, consumers decide whether to remain without advice or accept the advisor’s
offer. If consumers decide to remain without advice, the game continues at stage 5,
otherwise, the advisor gives his product recommendation r = A,B to the consumer
at stage 4. At stage 5, consumers make their final purchase decisions and payoffs are
realized. For sake of simplicity, we do not discount any payoffs.
3.2.2 Advice under a fee-based remuneration system
Following Schiller and Weinert (2018), the advisor’s dominant strategy is to minimize
his expected costs after receiving his upfront payment f . These costs consist of per-
suasion costs for a product and potential reputational cost for an unsuitable product
recommendation. For a given private information q, the advisor incurs expected costs of
cA+(1−q)d for recommending the standard product A and cB+qd for recommending the
specialized product B. Thus, minimum expected costs for a product recommendation,
dependent on q, are given by
c(q) = min {cA + (1− q)d; cB + qd} (3.6)
and we derive a threshold
q∗fee :=

1
2 −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d for
1
2 −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d > 0
0 for 12 −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d ≤ 0
(3.7)
for which the advisor is better off by recommending the standard product A if q ≥ q∗fee
holds and the specialized product B otherwise. Since we consider an upward sloping
linear density g(q), it follows immediately G
(
1
2
)
< 12 and consequently
k(1−2G( 12))
2d > 0
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due to k > 0 and d > 0. As a consequence, it holds
q∗fee <
1
2
. (3.8)
This basically means that the advisor recommends the standard product A to all con-
sumers, for whom his private information q is in the interval
[
q∗fee, 1
]
and the special-
ized product B otherwise. Especially, he recommends product A for all q ∈
[
q∗fee,
1
2
)
,
although product B has a higher probability to match these consumers’ needs according
to his private information. In this case, the advisor is willing to incur higher expected
reputational costs for recommending product A contrary to his private information, since
he is able to compensate these higher reputational costs by lower persuasion costs for
the standard product A in comparison to the specialized product B.
3.2.3 Equilibrium analysis under a fee-based remuneration system
In order to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the concept of backward induc-
tion. At stage 5, we have to consider two different histories. Either the consumer has
accepted the advisor’s offer for the fee f at stage 3 or he has declined it. For those who
have declined the offer, the purchase decision is straight forward given by assumption
(3.3) with no purchase at all. Those, who have accepted the offer at stage 3, receive
a product recommendation r = A,B at stage 4. Consumers are able to anticipate the
advisor’s cutoff q∗fee according to their common information and consequently anticipate
that receiving product recommendation r = A is equivalent to the information q ≥ q∗fee
and, analogous, r = B is equivalent to the information q < q∗fee. Thus, consumers
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conditional product valuations, dependent on r = A,B are given by
E
[
vA (q) | q ≥ q∗fee
]
=
∫ 1
q∗fee
vA(q)
g(q)
1−G(q∗fee)
dq
>
∫ 1
q∗fee
vB(q)
g(q)
1−G(q∗fee)
dq = E
[
vB (q) | q ≥ q∗fee
]
, (3.9)
for r = A and
E
[
vB (q) | q < q∗fee
]
=
∫ q∗fee
0
vB(q)
g(q)
G(q∗fee)
dq
>
∫ q∗fee
0
vA(q)
g(q)
G(q∗fee)
dq = E
[
vA (q) | q < q∗fee
]
. (3.10)
for r = B. The upward sloping linear density g(q) implies strict inequalities in (3.9) and
(3.10). Consequently, if a consumer actually purchases a product, this purchase decision
is always in line with the advisor’s product recommendation.
According to the advisor’s dominant strategy given by (3.7), at stage 4, the advisor
recommends the standard product A with respective persuasion costs cA, if q ≥ q∗fee
holds and the specialized product B with respective persuasion costs cB otherwise.
At stage 3, the consumer has two options: Accept the advisor’s offer or decline it.
The decision between these two options crucially depends on consumers’ willingness to
pay for the advisor’s product recommendation. The expected payoff for declining the
advisor’s offer is zero, since then, the consumer does not purchase any product at stage
5. Otherwise, the consumer expects to receive product recommendation r = A with
probability 1 − G(q∗fee) and product recommendation r = B with probability G(q∗fee).
Considering product prices, consumers’ break even condition for accepting the advisor’s
offer is given by
G(q∗fee)
(
E
[
vB (q) | q < q∗fee
]− pB)+ (1−G(q∗fee)) (E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗fee]− pA) ≥ f.
(3.11)
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In this case, the expected value of information gained from advice exceeds the upfront
fee f for which this information can be purchased.
At stage 2, the advisor faces his own participation constraint f ≥ E [c(q)] as a lower
bound for f and consumers’ participation constraint (3.11). Thus, he offers his advice
service for the fee f , which satisfies both conditions and f = E [c(q)] otherwise. In
particular, we define advice (in terms of q∗fee) as sufficiently informative, if
G(q∗fee)
(
E
[
vB (q) | q < q∗fee
]− pB)+(1−G(q∗fee)) (E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗fee]− pA) ≥ E [c(q)]
(3.12)
holds. Then, consumers’ expected surplus (gross of fee f) from requesting advice ex-
ceeds the advisor’s expected costs for giving a product recommendation. Thus (3.12)
constitutes a necessary condition for the existence of a market for financial advice.
At stage 1 product providers set their respective product prices pA and pB, consider-
ing production costs γ and both, the advisor’s and consumers’ participation constraint,
since there is no possibility to sell a product directly to consumers and circumvent the
advisor.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a unique equilibrium, which depends on the quality of
information from advice. If advice is sufficiently informative, product providers set their
prices pA(q
∗
fee) = E
[
vA (q) | q ≥ q∗fee
]
− E [c(q)] and pB(q∗fee) = E
[
vB (q) | q < q∗fee
]
−
E [c(q)], respectively. The advisor charges a fee f = E [c(q)], consumers accept this
offer and purchase the recommended product. However, consumers are not optimally
matched with products through advice (q∗fee <
1
2) and as a consequence, the standard
product provider possesses an inefficiently high market share, whereas the specialized
product provider possesses an inefficiently low market share. If advice is not sufficiently
informative, no market for advice exists and no products are purchased.
Proposition 3.1 states that in equilibrium either no products are sold or consumers
request advice and purchase the recommended product. In the first case, advice is not
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sufficiently informative. This means, that it is not beneficial for consumers to request
advice for the corresponding fee f , since the expected surplus from requesting advice
does not compensate the fee, that they have to pay for it. This could be the case, if
advice is strongly biased or the utility difference between a suitable and an unsuitable
product vh − vl is small, so that consumers cannot derive a sufficiently high surplus
from more accurate information about the suitability of products. In the second case,
where products are sold, consumers derive a sufficiently high surplus from requesting
advice. However, product providers extract the whole rent generated through advice,
by charging a product price, that satisfies exactly consumers’ as well as the advisor’s
respective break even conditions. Implicitly, this result also states, that there is no
competition between product providers in equilibrium. This is due to the fact, that in
our benchmark scenario, product providers can only compete through product prices.
However, this is not beneficial for product providers, since by assumption (3.3), product
providers cannot sell their products directly to consumers due to a product valuation
below production costs, and consequently, they cannot sell their products to consumers
who are advised to purchase the opponent’s product by lowering the product price.
Furthermore, in line with Schiller and Weinert (2018), advice is biased, so that the
specialized product provider B possess an inefficiently low market share, since a fraction
of consumers for whom the specialized product B is the most suitable product according
to the advisor’s private information, receive a product recommendation r = A and follow
this recommendation. This bias in advice results from the advisor’s tradeoff between
persuasion costs for a product and potential reputational costs for an unsuitable product
recommendation as characterized by (3.7) and (3.8).
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3.3 Commission payments for sold products
3.3.1 Modified model
In this section, we slightly modify our benchmark model in order to analyze a situation,
where the advisor is exclusively compensated by product providers via commission pay-
ments if a corresponding product is sold. We denote commission payments from product
provider A with fA and those from product provider B with fB. Furthermore, we as-
sume, that commission payments are not disclosed to consumers. However, we assume
consumers to be aware of the fact, that commissions are paid by product providers to
the advisor and to be capable to form rational expectations about these. Therefore,
consumers react to observed price changes by changing their expectations about the
unobservable commission payments.16 The modified game sequence is defined in the
following way:
At stage 1, product providers simultaneously set their product prices pA and pB. At
stage 2, product providers simultaneously set their commission payments fA and fB. At
stage 3, consumers decide whether to remain without advice or to consult the advisor.
If consumers decide to remain without advice, the game continues at stage 5, otherwise,
the advisor gives his product recommendation r = A,B to the consumer at stage 4. At
stage 5, consumers make their final purchase decisions and payoffs are realized. Again,
we do not discount any payoffs.
3.3.2 Advice under a commission-based remuneration system
Given, that both products are sold with positive probability and consumers follow the
advisor’s product recommendation due to (3.9) and (3.10), the advisor maximizes his
payoff by considering commission payments for sold products fA and fB as well as the
16In financial and insurance markets, commission payments are usually calculated as a fraction of
the total investment sum for the corresponding product. Therefore it is straightforward, that consumers
associate a high product price (in the sense of a high investment volume) with a high commission payment
for the advisor and vice versa.
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corresponding persuasion costs cA and cB and potential reputational costs d. Conse-
quently, the advisor’s expected payoff, dependent on q, for recommending product A is
given by fA − cA − (1− q)d and for product B by fB − cB − qd, respectively. Thus, we
derive a new threshold
q∗com :=

0 for 12 − fA−fB2d −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d ≤ 0
1
2 − fA−fB2d −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d for 0 <
1
2 − fA−fB2d −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d < 1
1 for 12 − fA−fB2d −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d ≥ 1
(3.13)
for which the advisor is better off by giving a product recommendation r = A if q ≥ q∗com
holds and r = B otherwise. For q∗com ∈ (0, 1), it is straightforward, that ∂q
∗
com
∂fA
= − 12d < 0
and ∂q
∗
com
∂fB
= 12d > 0 holds. This enables product providers to steer the advisor’s product
recommendation, dependent on potential reputational costs d, through their commission
payments fA and fB, respectively. Put differently, commission payments for advisors
allow product providers to compete against each other in markets, where consumers
cannot be reached directly. Especially, for q∗com <
1
2 , advice is biased in favor of product
A, since the advisor recommends the standard product A for all q ∈ [q∗com, 12), although,
these consumers possess a higher probability that the specialized product B best suits
their needs and for q∗com >
1
2 advice is biased in favor of product B, since then, the advisor
recommends the specialized product B for all q ∈ [12 , q∗com) although, these consumers
possess a higher probability that the standard product A best suits their needs according
to the advisor’s private information. For q∗com =
1
2 advice is unbiased and all consumers
receive the optimal product recommendation.
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3.3.3 Equilibrium analysis under a commission-based remuneration
system
In this section, we consider pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. Since product
providers cannot circumvent the advisor by assumption (3.3), in equilibrium, where
products are sold, advice needs to provide sufficient information for consumers in the
sense, that at least the conditional product valuation for consumers according to the
advisor’s product recommendation r does not undercut the buying price for the rec-
ommended product. Consumers cannot observe the commission payments fA and fB
directly, however, they form rational beliefs fˆA and fˆB. Plugging these expected com-
mission payments into (3.13), consumers derive an expected threshold qˆ∗com for receiving
product recommendation r = A if q ≥ qˆ∗com holds and product recommendation r = B
otherwise.
For a given expected threshold qˆ∗com, product providers set their respective product
prices at stage 1 in order to extract the whole willingness to pay for their products by
setting product prices
pA(qˆ
∗
com) =
∫ 1
qˆ∗com
vA(q)
g(q)
1−G(qˆ∗com)
dq = E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗com] (3.14)
and
pB(qˆ
∗
com) =
∫ qˆ∗com
0
vB(q)
g(q)
G(qˆ∗com)
dq = E [vB (q) | q < qˆ∗com] , (3.15)
respectively. Setting a price below (3.14) and (3.15) is a dominated strategy for product
providers, since by assumption (3.3) consumers unconditional product valuations are
below production costs γ, and thus, conditional product valuations contrary to the advi-
sor’s product recommendation E [vA (q) | q < qˆ∗com] and E [vB (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗com] are clearly
also strictly below production costs for any qˆ∗com ∈ [0, 1]. As a consequence, product
providers do not have the possibility to attract consumers away from their competitors
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by lowering their product price.
At stage 2, product providers set their respective commission payments in order to
maximize their expected profits. At this stage, product prices pA and pB are already
fixed. Given, that consumers follow the advisor’s product recommendation, the expected
profit for product provider A is given by
piA = (pA − γ − fA) (1−G (q∗com)) (3.16)
and the expected profit for product provider B by
piB = (pB − γ − fB)G (q∗com) . (3.17)
These profits obviously depend on the advisor’s actual cutoff q∗com. Considering product
prices (3.14) and (3.15) and that in equilibrium qˆ∗com = q∗com holds, optimal commission
payments are given by first order conditions
fA = vA(q
∗
com)− γ − 2d
1−G(q∗com)
g(q∗com)
(3.18)
for product provider A and
fB = vB(q
∗
com)− γ − 2d
G(q∗com)
g(q∗com)
(3.19)
for product provider B, if these are positive and fA = 0 and fB = 0 otherwise.
In this scenario, commission payments of product providers are the only source of
compensation for the advisor. From the advisor’s perspective, expected commission
payments at least need to cover his expected costs for giving a product recommendation.
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Thus, the advisor’s participation constraint is given by
G(q∗com)fB + (1−G(q∗com)) fA ≥G(q∗com)E [cB + qd | q < q∗com]
+ (1−G(q∗com))E [cA + (1− q)d | q ≥ q∗com] . (3.20)
We denote advice (in terms of q∗com) as sufficiently informative, if the magnitudes of
marginal product valuations vA(q
∗
com) and vB(q
∗
com) as a key driving factor for optimal
commission payments satisfy (3.20).
Proposition 3.2 There exists a unique equilibrium, which depends on the quality of
information from advice. If advice is sufficiently informative, product providers’ prices
are given by pA(q
∗
com) = E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗com] and pB(q∗com) = E [vB (q) | q < q∗com] and
product providers’ commission payments by fA = max
{
0; vA(q
∗
com)− γ − 2d1−G(q
∗
com)
g(q∗com)
}
and fB = max
{
0; vB(q
∗
com)− γ − 2dG(q
∗
com)
g(q∗com)
}
, respectively. Consumers request advice
and purchase the recommended product. If advice is not sufficiently informative, no
market for advice exists and no products are purchased.
Analogous to a fee-based remuneration system, Proposition 3.2 states, that there ex-
ists a unique equilibrium, where either no products are sold and consequently no market
for financial advice exists due to the poor quality of advice, or that all consumers follow
the advisor’s product recommendation in order to maximize their (positive) payoffs. In
the latter case, product providers extract the whole consumer surplus, by charging a cor-
responding price equal to the conditional product valuations according to the advisor’s
product recommendation r.
Optimal commission payments in equilibrium characterized by Proposition 3.2 de-
pend on various factors. The magnitude of commission payments of both product
providers depend on the potential reputational costs d, that the advisor incurs sub-
sequently of an unsuitable product recommendation. Intuitively, an advisor who has to
fear high reputational costs possesses a low responsiveness to commission payments. As
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a consequence, high potential reputational costs result in low incentives for both product
providers to raise commission payments and vice versa.
Furthermore, a higher margin corresponds to a higher incentive to raise commis-
sion payments for both product providers. Margins are given by pi − γ − fi, i = A,B.
Product prices in equilibrium are equal to consumers’ conditional valuations of the cor-
responding products. These conditional product valuations are calculated by a weighted
average according to g(q) of marginal product valuations vi(q), i = A,B. Marginal
product valuations are continuous functions of q with ∂vA(q)∂q > 0 and
∂vB(q)
∂q < 0 and
consequently consumers’ conditional product valuations are higher, if the corresponding
lowest marginal valuation, which is given by vi(q
∗
com), i = A,B, is higher. Thus, an in-
crease in consumers’ marginal product valuation at the advisor’s cutoff q∗com corresponds
to a higher price, that product providers will charge and as a result to a higher incentive
to raise commission payments.
Commissions must be paid for all sales that are made, i.e. not only for a marginal
sale at q∗com, but also for all sales G(q∗com) by the specialized product provider B and
for all sales 1 − G(q∗com) by the standard product provider A. Therefore, an increase
in market share reduces incentives to raise commission payments, since in comparison,
a marginal raise in commissions leads to a lower margin for a high market share and
consequently to a high decrease in product provider’s profit, whereas a low market share
corresponds only to a small decrease in the corresponding profits. This corresponds to
the classical tradeoff between price and quantity in oligopoly theory.
In addition, commissions are strategic complements for both product providers. An-
alytically, this can be seen by ∂fA∂fB > 0 and
∂fB
∂fA
> 0. Intuitively, an increase in the
opponent’s commission payments reduces a product provider’s market share. This re-
sults, as mentioned above, first, in a higher price due to a higher conditional product
valuation of consumers, and second, in a lower damping factor for raising commissions
due to the lower amount of sales for which commissions must be paid. Both factors result
55
in higher incentives to increase the own commission payments. As a consequence, this
strategic complementary has an additional boosting effect for both product providers to
raise commission payments.
Proposition 3.3 In unique equilibrium, where both products are sold, the specialized
product provider B’s optimal commission payments are strictly higher than those of the
standard product provider A.
Proposition 3.3 states, that in equilibrium characterized by Proposition 3.2, the
specialized product provider B has higher incentives to raise commission payments in
comparison to the standard product provider A. This is a result of various factors,
that are described before. First of all, in the absence of commission payments, the
specialized product provider B possesses an inefficiently low market share below G
(
1
2
)
.
Thus, the chargeable price is higher for the specialized product provider B in comparison
to the standard product provider A and, furthermore, the dampening effect of a large
market share for increasing commission payments is more severe for the standard product
providerA in comparison to the specialized product providerB. On the other hand, these
higher (ex ante) incentives for product provider B to raise commissions in comparison to
product provider A yields a higher boosting effect, due to the strategic complementary of
raising commissions, for product provider A. However, this effect does not compensate
the higher incentives for the specialized product provider B due to the low market share
and the higher chargeable price for their products.
3.4 Welfare analysis and policy implications
Turning to welfare analysis, we consider the quality of advice in terms of q∗fee and q
∗
com
under both remuneration systems. Taking into account, that in equilibrium under a
commission-based remuneration system, where products are sold, commission payments
of the specialized product provider B are strictly higher than those of the standard
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product provider A according to Proposition 3.3, a comparison of the advisor’s thresh-
olds, given by (3.7) and (3.13) yields a strictly higher threshold for the advisor under
a commission-based remuneration system in comparison to a fee-based remuneration
system, i.e. q∗com > q∗fee.
Considering the total welfare perspective, the advisor’s compensation, regardless of
the absolute height, does not have any implication on social welfare. The upfront fee f
paid by consumers, as well as the commission payments fA and fB are transfers from
this perspective. Furthermore, production costs for both products are equal and conse-
quently do not affect total welfare either. However, another quality of advice implies,
that the advisor incurs different expected costs for giving a product recommendation.
These advisor’s expected costs are a continuous function of the threshold q∗fee and q
∗
com,
respectively, and are minimized by the advisor’s dominant strategy in a fee-based remu-
neration system characterized by q∗fee. Therefore, any change in quality of advice leads
to higher expected costs that the advisor incurs for giving a product recommendation.
In summary, a (potential) difference in total welfare between both remuneration systems
due to a difference in quality of advice is affected by two factors: The corresponding dif-
ference in consumers’ conditional product valuations and the difference in the advisor’s
expected costs for giving a product recommendation.
Proposition 3.4 In unique equilibrium, where both products are sold, there exists a
threshold ∆f∗ > 0. If the difference between the higher commission payment of the
specialized product provider B and the lower commission payment of the standard product
provider A are below (above) this threshold, i.e. fB−fA < ∆f∗ (fB−fA > ∆f∗), social
welfare is strictly higher (lower) under a commission-based remuneration system for the
advisor in comparison to a fee-based remuneration system. If fB − fA = ∆f∗, social
welfare is equal under both remuneration systems.
Proposition 3.4 states, that in comparison, a commission-based remuneration system
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is superior to a fee-based remuneration system from a total welfare perspective, if com-
mission payments are not that far apart and vice versa. This result yields an interesting
policy implication. When enacting a ban on commission payments for financial advice,
a regulator should consider the present commission structure, since this has crucial im-
pacts on total welfare. In our model, the only way to generate welfare is by matching
consumers’ needs with corresponding products. Since welfare affecting costs are mini-
mized under a fee-based remuneration system according to (3.7), but welfare is higher
under a commission-based remuneration system, if fB − fA < ∆f∗ holds, a higher total
welfare implies that more consumers are matched with their most suitable product.
Obviously, the question arises, whether the difference between commission payments
are below this threshold in the real world or not. Empirical evidence for this case is pro-
vided by Anagol et al. (2017). Their empirical finding is, that a standard product which
corresponds to a low commission payment is recommended inefficiently often in compari-
son to a specialized product which corresponds to a high commission payment. Applying
this finding to our model yields an advisor’s threshold under a commission-based remu-
neration system q∗com <
1
2 . It is straightforward by the proof of Proposition 3.4, that in
this case, the difference between commission payments are below the threshold ∆f∗ and
consequently, total welfare is higher under a commission-based remuneration system.
3.5 Conclusions
The present analysis aims at considering fee-based and commission-based remuneration
systems for financial advisors from a total welfare perspective under the assumption,
that advisors face transaction costs from persuading consumers in the advice process and
consumers have initial information about the suitability of products and their needs. To
this end we show in a theoretical model, that a commission-based remuneration system
is superior to a fee-based remuneration system, if the difference in commission payments
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is sufficiently low. In this case, more consumers are matched with their best suitable
product under a commission-based remuneration system in comparison to a fee-based
remuneration system. Hence, our analysis contradicts the intuitive superiority of the
latter one. Our results suggest, that regulators should consider the present structure of
commission payments in the respective market, before enacting a ban on commissions,
since this action is not a universal remedy for misconduct in financial advice, but may
also backfire and lower the quality of advice as well as total welfare.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. First, we consider the case, where advice is sufficiently
informative, i.e. (3.11) holds. Purchase decisions at stage 5 are given in the analysis:
Consumers who have declined the advisor’s offer, do not purchase a product, consumers
who have accepted the advisor’s offer purchase the recommended product due to (3.9)
and (3.10) if E
[
vA (q) | q ≥ q∗fee
]
−pA ≥ 0 holds for r = A or E
[
vB (q) | q < q∗fee
]
−pB ≥
0 for r = B, respectively, and no purchase at all otherwise. At stage 4, the advisor gives
his product recommendation according to (3.7) with r = A for q ≥ q∗fee and r = B
for q < q∗fee for those consumers, who accepted his offer. At stage 3, consumers accept
the advisor’s offer if their participation constraint (3.11) is fulfilled and decline the
offer otherwise. At stage 2, prices are already fixed, so the advisor offers his product
recommendation for a fee f that fulfills consumers’ participation constraint, as well as
his own participation constraint f ≥ E [c(q)]. At stage 1, product providers set their
respective prices in order to maximize their profit and to cover at least their production
costs γ. Since products cannot be sold directly to consumers, product prices need to be
set in accordance with consumers’ and the advisor’s participation constraint. In order
to extract the maximum rent for product providers, both participation constraints are
binding, since otherwise, product providers’ profits are not maximized. Market shares
are given by G(q∗fee) for product provider B and 1−G(q∗fee) for product provider A, since
by assumption (3.3) unconditional product valuations are below production costs, which
implies conditional product valuations contrary to the advisor’s product recommendation
below production costs, i.e. E
[
vA (q) | q < q∗fee
]
< γ and E
[
vB (q) | q ≥ q∗fee
]
< γ.
Thus, there is no possibility for product provider’s to set a price which covers at least
production costs and attracts consumers of purchasing their product contrary to the
advisor’s recommendation. Therefore, profit maximizing prices are uniquely given by
pA(q
∗
fee) = E
[
vA (q) | q ≥ q∗fee
]
−E [c(q)] and pB(q∗fee) = E
[
vB (q) | q < q∗fee
]
−E [c(q)],
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so that both participation constraints are binding. This implies the advisor’s offer is set
to f = E [c(q)] and due to assumption (3.11) all consumers request advice. Due to to the
linear upward sloping density g(q) and q∗fee <
1
2 given by (3.8), it holds G
(
q∗fee
)
< G
(
1
2
)
and 1−G
(
q∗fee
)
> 1−G (12). Therefore, the standard product provider A possesses an
inefficiently high market share, whereas the specialized product provider B possesses an
inefficiently low market share. The case, where advice is not sufficiently informative is
straightforward given by no product purchase at all and no market for financial advice,
since consumers’ participation constraint for advice cannot be fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We start with the case, where advice is not sufficiently
informative. Then, consumers are not willing to pay a price above or equal to production
costs for the corresponding products and as a consequence, product providers are not
able to pay positive commission payments to the advisor. Since expected costs for giving
a product recommendation are strictly positive, the advisor’s participation constraint is
not fulfilled and thus, no market for financial advice exists and no products are sold
by assumption (3.3). The other case corresponds to sufficiently informative advice. We
show the conditions for a unique equilibrium in three steps.
Sequential rationality: We assume a consumers’ expected cutoff qˆ∗com and that the
condition for sufficiently informative advice (3.20) holds. At stage 5, consumers pur-
chase decisions are in line with the advisor’s product recommendation according to
conditional product valuations (3.9) and (3.10) for replacing q∗com with qˆ∗com if these
are not below corresponding product prices pA and pB. Otherwise, no products are
purchased. Since (3.20) holds, the advisor’s expected costs for giving a product rec-
ommendation are covered, and consequently the advisor gives product recommendation
r = A for q ≥ q∗com and r = B otherwise. At stage 3, all consumers request ad-
vice, since there is no upfront fee to pay and thus consumers’ participation constraint
is fulfilled. At stage 2, product providers set their commission payments according
to the first order condition with by fA = max
{
0; vA(q
∗
com)− γ − 2d1−G(q
∗
com)
g(q∗com)
}
and
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fB = max
{
0; vB(q
∗
com)− γ − 2dG(q
∗
com)
g(q∗com)
}
, respectively. At stage 1, product providers
set their prices in order to maximize their profits according to consumers expected cut-
off qˆ∗com with pA(qˆ∗com) = E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗com] and pB(qˆ∗com) = E [vB (q) | q < qˆ∗com].
Consistency of beliefs: For q∗com = qˆ∗com participation constraints are satisfied, and
thus the above described sequence, constitutes an equilibrium.
Uniqueness: In order to show uniqueness, fA(q
∗
com) and fB(q
∗
com) may not intersect
more than once. We denote the slope of g(q) with α. Since g(q) is linear and strictly
positive for all q ∈ [0, 1], and ∫ 10 g(q)dq = 1 holds (probability distribution), we can
express g(q) = αq +
(
1− α2
)
, where α ∈ (0, 2). Thus, it holds
∂
∂q
G(q)
g(q)
=
α2(2q2 − 2q + 1) + 4α(q − 1) + 4
(α(2q − 1) + 2)2 > 0 (3.21)
and
∂
∂q
1−G(q)
g(q)
=
α2(−2q2 + 2q − 1) + 4αq − 4
(α(2q − 1) + 2)2 < 0 (3.22)
for q ∈ [0, 1]. Together with ∂vA(q)∂q > 0 and ∂vB(q)∂q < 0, we derive partial derivatives for
optimal commission payments ∂fA∂q∗com
> 0 and ∂fB∂q∗com
< 0 and thus a unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. In equilibrium, where both products are sold, the
advisor’s participation constraint (3.20) hast to be fulfilled and thus, at least one of
the two product providers possesses a strictly positive commission payment. We proof
fB > fA in equilibrium by contradiction.
Let optimal commission payments given by (3.18) and (3.19) satisfy fA ≥ fB. This
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is equivalent to
fA − fB ≥ 0 (3.23)
⇔vA(q∗com)− γ − 2d
1−G(q∗com)
g(q∗com)
−
(
vB(q
∗
com)− γ − 2d
G(q∗com)
g(q∗com)
)
≥ 0 (3.24)
⇔(2q∗com − 1)(vh − vl)− 2d
1− 2G(q∗com)
g(q∗com)
≥ 0. (3.25)
For q∗com ≤ 12 , it holds (2q∗com − 1)(vh − vl) ≤ 0 and −2d1−2G(q
∗
com)
g(q∗com)
< 0 due to the
increasing distribution function G(q) with G
(
1
2
)
< 12 . Therefore, q
∗
com >
1
2 has to hold.
By definition (3.13) of q∗com, this implies
1
2
− fA − fB
2d
− k
(
1− 2G (12))
2d
>
1
2
(3.26)
⇔− fA − fB
2d
− k
(
1− 2G (12))
2d
> 0 (3.27)
⇔fB − fA > k
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
. (3.28)
Due to k > 0 and G
(
1
2
)
< 12 , it follows k
(
1− 2G (12)) > 0 and thus fB − fA > 0, which
contradicts the assumption fA ≥ fB. Consequently, the optimal commission payments
in equilibrium satisfy fB > fA.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Since both products are sold, it holds 0 < q∗fee <
1
2 by
Proposition 3.1 and 0 < q∗com < 1 by Proposition 3.2. Furthermore, it holds fB > fA due
to Proposition 3.3. Thus, from (3.7) and (3.13), it follows q∗com = q∗fee +
fB−fA
2d > q
∗
fee.
The change in consumer surplus is then given by
CS(q∗com) =
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(vB(q)− vA(q)) g(q)dq = (vh − vl)
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(1− 2q) g(q)dq. (3.29)
The advisor faces a change in persuasion costs for recommending the specialized product
B instead of the standard product A and a change in potential reputational costs d given
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by
AC(q∗com) =
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(qd+ cB − (1− q)d− cA) g(q)dq (3.30)
= d
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(2q − 1) g(q)dq +
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(cB − cA) g(q)dq (3.31)
= −d
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(1− 2q) g(q)dq + [G (q∗com)−G (q∗fee)](1− 2G(12
))
k,
(3.32)
where AC(q∗com) > 0 holds, since the advisor’s expected costs are minimized at q∗fee and
as a consequence are strictly higher for q > q∗fee due to (3.7). Since the advisor’s com-
pensation does not affect total welfare and production costs are equal for both products,
the change in total welfare is given by
ω(q∗com) = CS(q
∗
com)−AC(q∗com) (3.33)
= [(vh − vl) + d]
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(1− 2q) g(q)dq − [G (q∗com)−G (q∗fee)](1− 2G(12
))
k.
(3.34)
Since 0 < q∗com < 1, it holds q∗com =
1
2− fA−fB2d −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d . Thus ω(q
∗
com) is a continuous
and differentiable function of fB−fA (third degree polynomial due to linear density g(q)).
If there is a change in sign of ∂ω(q
∗
com)
∂(fB−fA) from positive to negative for q
∗
com ∈ (q∗fee, 1), this
implies the existence of a value in differences of commission payments, for which total
welfare reaches its maximum dependent on fB − fA and furthermore, the existence of
a threshold ∆f∗ for which
∫ ∆f∗
0
∂ω(q∗com)
∂(fB−fA)d(fB − fA) = 0 holds. Then, total welfare
is higher under a commission-based remuneration system in comparison to a fee-based
remuneration system if fB−fA < ∆f∗ holds due to the marginal change in total welfare
for fB − fA in this domain and vice versa for fB − fA > ∆f∗. The latter case is
guaranteed, since for such a high difference in commission payments, so that q∗com = 1
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holds, total welfare would be strictly negative by assumption (3.3) and consequently,
this also holds for a sufficiently small domain around q∗com = 1 due to the continuity of
ω(q∗com). Taking the partial derivative of change in total welfare with respect to fB − fA
yields
∂ω(q∗com)
∂(fB − fA) = [(vh − vl) + d]
1
2d
(1− 2q∗com) g(q∗com)−
1
2d
g(q∗com)
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k.
(3.35)
Using q∗com = q∗fee +
fB−fA
2d , it holds
∂ω(q∗com)
∂(fB − fA) > 0 (3.36)
⇔ [(vh − vl) + d]
(
1− 2(q∗fee +
fB − fA
2d
)
)
−
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k > 0 (3.37)
⇔ [(vh − vl) + d] (1− fB − fA
d
) + [(vh − vl) + d] (−2q∗fee) >
(
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k (3.38)
⇔− 2q∗fee > −(1−
fB − fA
d
) +
(
1− 2G (12)) k
(vh − vl) + d (3.39)
⇔q∗fee <
1− fB−fAd
2
−
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2(vh − vl) + 2d (3.40)
⇔1
2
−
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2d
<
1− fB−fAd
2
−
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2(vh − vl) + 2d (3.41)
Since vh − vl > 0 holds, it follows
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2d
>
(
1− 2G (12)) k
2(vh − vl) + 2d. (3.42)
Thus, for sufficiently small differences between commission payments fB − fA, (3.41)
holds.
Considering (3.34), it holds
[(vh − vl) + d]
∫ q∗com
1
2
(1− 2q) g(q)dq < 0 (3.43)
65
for q∗com >
1
2 . Since g(q) is an upward sloping density, there exists q¯
∗
com < 1 such that
for q∗fee > 0 it holds
[(vh − vl) + d]
∫ q¯∗com
q∗fee
(1− 2q) g(q)dq = 0 (3.44)
and
[(vh − vl) + d]
∫ q∗com
q∗fee
(1− 2q) g(q)dq < 0 (3.45)
for q∗com ∈ (q¯∗com, 1) and the left side of (3.45) strictly decreases with an increase in q∗com.
Considering G
(
1
2
)
< 12 and k > 0, it holds
[
G (q∗com)−G
(
q∗fee
)](
1− 2G
(
1
2
))
k > 0 (3.46)
due to q∗com > q∗fee and strictly increasing distribution function G(q) and consequently
the subtrahend of (3.41) increases with an increase in q∗com. Thus, in summary, it holds
∂ω(q∗com)
∂(fB−fA) < 0 for sufficiently high differences between commission payments fB − fA so
that q∗com =
1
2 − fA−fB2d −
k(1−2G( 12))
2d ∈ (q¯∗com, 1).
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Chapter 4
Competing for consumers in
financial markets under a
fee-based compensation system
for advisors17
Abstract
In financial markets where consumers can only be reached through an advisor, prod-
uct providers usually compete indirectly through commissions payments to the advi-
sor. Therefore, a regulatory ban on commissions restricts competition between product
providers. We formulate a gametheoretical model in order to study the impact of a such
a ban on competition between product providers. In a market with sufficiently differ-
entiated products, competition through prices is not beneficial for product providers.
However, marketing measures may serve as a competitive tool for product providers to
attract consumers away from their competitors.
JEL Codes: D21, D43, G20, L15, M30
17The following chapter is a single authored manuscript by the candidate and yet unpublished.
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4.1 Introduction
In markets with complex financial products consumers usually cannot judge which prod-
uct best suits their needs. Thus, product providers can only reach their consumers
through a financial advisor, whose main purpose is to explain product characteristics
and why these characteristics suit consumers’ needs. It is a widespread practice, that
product providers pay direct or indirect commissions to financial advisors which enables
them to steer advisors’ product recommendations to consumers. Thus, it is often ar-
gued, that this practice leads to biased advice, which encouraged regulators in the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands to enact a ban on commissions relating to financial ad-
vice.18 However, commissions can be seen as a strategic tool for competition between
product providers and a ban on commissions can restrict this competition.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a framework to analyze the
impact of a ban on commissions in markets for financial advice on competition between
product providers who can only reach their consumers through an advisor. To this
end, we extend the model of Schiller and Weinert (2018). There, the advisor need to
conduct costly persuasion when recommending a product to a consumer, dependent on
the consumer’s initial belief about the suitability of products.19 Our extension allows us
to analyze competition between product providers if commissions are banned and the
only compensation for the advisor is an upfront fee paid by his consumers. In particular,
we analyze whether product providers are able to compete through two channels in
the absence of commissions: First, price competition. Second, informative advertising.
However, none of these channels enables product providers to circumvent the advisor.
18At the end of 2012, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which was at this time responsible for
regulating financial advice in the United Kingdom, enacted a ban on commissions for retail financial
advice, both for independent and restricted advisors. In January 2013, the Netherlands Authority for
the Financial Markets (AFM) banned commissions for complex financial products including mortgages
and life insurance products.
19In this case, persuasion is considered as stating reasons and explanations why a particular product
suits consumers’ needs (Schiller and Weinert, 2018) or, put differently, advertising attributes of the
product that are positively related to quality in a consumer’s specific situation (Mullainathan et al.,
2008).
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Our model consists of a simple market with the following participants: Two product
providers, one offering a standard product and the other offering a specialized product.
Consumers with different needs who face the choice of buying one of these two prod-
ucts. An advisor who possesses superior knowledge about the suitability of products and
consumers. Consumers’ needs and product characteristics are horizontal differentiated
and consumers’ utility is maximized if the purchased product suits consumers’ respec-
tive needs. Ex ante, consumers cannot observe, whether a product matches their needs.
However, it is common knowledge, that the standard product matches consumers’ char-
acteristics more often than the specialized product. Consumers can consult an advisor in
order to get more accurate information about the suitability of products to their needs.
The advisor’s only compensation is an upfront fee paid by consumers. Recommending
the standard product and thus confirming consumers’ initial belief goes in hand with
lower persuasion costs for the advisor than recommending the specialized product. How-
ever, the advisor incurs a penalty payment imposed by a regulator, if the recommended
product does not suit the consumers’ needs. Thus, the advisor is facing a tradeoff be-
tween persuasion costs and potential penalty payments when recommending a product
dependent on his private information. Product providers can set their respective product
prices and engage in advertising. A lower product price may attract consumers of this
product even though consumers know that the other product is more likely to match the
respective needs. Advertising does not result in a direct effect for consumers, however,
advertising for a product lowers the advisor’s persuasion costs for this product and hence
may steer the advisor’s product recommendation.
Our main result is, that advertising may serve as a channel for competition between
product providers in markets where commissions are banned, but consumers can only
be reached through an advisor, whereas product providers do not have an incentive to
engage in competition through product prices, if products are sufficiently differentiated.
The penalty payment for advisors in case of an unsuitable product recommendation
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plays a key role for competition between product providers, although the penalty pay-
ment only affects product providers indirectly, since in case, the penalty must be paid by
the advisor. If the advisor has to fear a low penalty resulting from an unsuitable prod-
uct recommendation, the specialized product provider would possess an inefficiently low
market share with respect to consumer matching in the absence of any possibilities to
influence the advisor’s product recommendation, since then, the advisor will recommend
the standard product too often due to the lower persuasion costs for this product in com-
parison to the specialized product. However, advertising allows the specialized product
provider to increase his market share to a certain degree and consequently more con-
sumers are matched with a suitable product. If the advisor has to fear a high penalty
payment, both product providers possess a market share, where all consumers are nearly
optimally matched. But even in this case, the standard product provider’s market share
is too large. In equilibrium with high penalty payments for the advisor, consumers
are worse matched with suitable products when product providers are able to engage
in advertising in comparison to a scenario without any competition, since in this case
the standard product provider has higher incentives to engage in advertising than his
competitor. As a consequence, the penalty payment imposed by the regulator for unsuit-
able product recommendations may have unintended consequences regarding consumer
matching, if the penalty payment is set above a certain threshold.
The individual incentives of both product providers depend on various factors. Ob-
viously, the effectiveness of marketing measures plays a key role for product providers
incentives to raise marketing expenses. However, for a given level of effectiveness, a high
margin results in high incentives to engage in marketing due to the classical tradeoff be-
tween pushing sales and reducing the margin, or price and quantity in oligopoly theory.
A high margin necessarily corresponds to a high product price, which crucially depends
on consumers’ willingness to pay for a product. The willingness to pay for a product
is determined by consumers’ expected payoff from purchasing a product. If consumers
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are pretty sure, that a product suits their needs, their willingness to pay is high. This
is the case, if a product provider possesses only a small market share, since then, those
consumers who decide to purchase this product are not mixed together with consumers
for whom the competitor’s product best suits their needs. Furthermore, incentives for
a product provider to engage in marketing are high, if the competitor exhibits high ex-
penses for marketing due to the following reason. For a given level of marketing expenses
of a product provider, an increase in the competitor’s marketing expenses would decrease
the product provider’s market share and consequently increase the consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for his product. This implies, that this product provider can charge a higher
price for his product and thus increase his margin. As a consequence, the incentives for
this product provider to raise his own marketing expenses increase. Thus, marketing
measures can be seen as a competitive tool for product providers, since the amount
that one product provider spends on marketing depends crucially on the competitor’s
expenses for marketing measures.
Our model is related to literature which analyzes competition between horizontal
differentiated product providers, if consumers can only be reached through an advisor.
This is the case in markets for complex products like financial products, where the ben-
efit for consumers crucially depends on matching between product characteristics and
individual needs, but consumers do not possess (sufficiently accurate) information about
the suitability of products before purchasing them. We consider the case of experience
goods, where consumers may learn after some time, whether a product suits their needs
(Nelson, 1970). In extreme cases, financial products can also be considered as experience
goods, where consumers cannot get any information about the suitability in retrospect
of their purchase (Darby and Karni, 1973). Bolton et al. (2007) and Inderst and Ot-
taviani (2012a) show, that in financial markets, product providers indirectly compete
for consumers through commission payments to the advisor. However, we consider the
case, where advisors are exclusively compensated by consumers through an upfront fee.
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Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) show in a theoretical model, that consumers, who are
able to anticipate the quality of advice, demand exclusively advice for a fee rather than
an indirect payment through commissions. As a direct result, advice is unbiased in
equilibrium. However, an implicit result is, that product providers do not compete for
consumers under a fee for advice remuneration system, and especially do not try to in-
fluence the advisor’s product recommendation. Focht et al. (2013) concludes that advice
is not necessarily unbiased if commissions are banned, since product providers have the
possibility to steer advisors through side contracts. However, if side contracting is not
possible and commissions are banned, Focht et al. (2013) also implicitly conclude, that
product providers do not compete for consumers.
A common assumption of the aforementioned literature is a perfect rational con-
sumer, who is immune to any uninformative attempts by product providers to change
his purchase decision. If it is not possible to reach a consumer directly, product providers
do not have a possibility to compete for them, other than direct or indirect payments
to the advisor. This assumption seems reasonable for models of markets with complex
products and rational consumers. However, a real world phenomenon is, that consumers
often possess various irrationalities, especially limited knowledge and a lack of intel-
lectual capacity to process any information they are provided with (Campbell, 2016).
Therefore, Gennaioli et al. (2015) identifies trust between consumers and advisor as a key
source for the demand of advice, rather than objective measurements. For our analysis,
we extend the model of Schiller and Weinert (2018), where consumers are not perfectly
rational and advice is not just cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). A key aspect of
Schiller and Weinert (2018) is, that bounded rational consumers need to be persuaded
of a product by the advisor in the sense of Mullainathan et al. (2008) and the advisor
faces transaction costs in persuading them. Thereby, persuasion costs for a product are
inversely proportional to the strength of consumers’ initial belief that this product suits
the respective needs. Empirical findings of Anagol et al. (2017) and Mullainathan et al.
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(2012) indicate the existence of such persuasion costs as a real world phenomenon.
Another common assumption is, that it is not possible for product providers to di-
rectly communicate information about the suitability of products to consumers and thus
circumvent the advisor (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a). We relax this assumption and
allow product providers in our model to directly pass information to consumers in the
following way. In the sense of Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Stahl II (1994), Meurer and
Stahl II (1994) and Soberman (2004), we assume that product providers can engage in
informative advertising. In this case, advertising is a way to communicate information
about the suitability of products to the consumer and therefore may serve as a competi-
tive tool to attract consumers away from other firms. In a market with simple products,
informative advertising may replace an advisor. For example, Bertrand et al. (2010)
find empirical evidence, that advertising content increases demand for simple consumer
loans. Hamilton (2009) analyzes informative advertising in differentiated oligopoly mar-
kets and finds an oversupply of advertising if products are highly differentiated. This
result is in line with our model, where marketing does not only serve to inform con-
sumers, but is also used as a competitive tool. However, we consider the case of financial
markets, where products are complex. Thus, we assume, that product providers are
able to pass information to consumers by informative advertising, but the crucial aspect
is, that consumers are not able to process these information directly due to a lack of
knowledge and intellectual capacity (Campbell, 2016). In particular, we assume, that
consumers cannot match product characteristics to their specific needs, even if they are
provided with all information about product characteristics. However, it is easier for an
advisor to persuade a consumer of a product, if the consumer is already familiar with all
product characteristics. Our model puts this phenomenon of irrationality into the con-
text of competition between product providers in a market with horizontal differentiable
products, where consumers can only be reached through an advisor and commission
payments are effectively banned by regulation.
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4.2 Basic Model
We consider a modified model of Schiller and Weinert (2018), which is based on Inderst
and Ottaviani (2012a). In particular, we consider a simple market for financial advice.
This market is represented by two product providers i = A,B, a mass of one consumer
and a monopolistic advisor.20 All players are risk neutral and try to maximize their
expected payoffs. Consumers face the choice of whether to purchase one single unit of
the product providers’ corresponding products A and B for respective prices pA and pB
set by product providers. Product providers’ production costs are normalized to zero.
Each consumer is characterized by an unobservable binary state variable Θ = A,B. If a
purchased product matches a consumer’s characteristics, he derives utility vh and utility
vl otherwise, where vh > 0 > vl holds. We normalize the utility of not purchasing to
zero.
Although our analysis focuses on financial markets, we abstract from specific prod-
ucts. Hence, our model is applicable to various situations. In the sense of Inderst and
Ottaviani (2012a) products can be seen as different investment plans or pension schemes,
where the suitability depends on a consumer’s financial condition, tax status or life ex-
pectancy. Furthermore, one could also interpret the two products as such that are not
originated in the financial context like different drugs for curing a specific disease or
other medical treatments.
One key aspect of our model is, that private information about the matching proba-
bility of consumers and products is possessed by the advisor, rather than by consumers
or by product providers. Thus, consumers can consult an advisor in order to get more
accurate information about the suitability of the products. Thereby, advisors help to
explain product characteristics to consumers and why these characteristics suit the in-
20Usually, a monopolistic advisor market seems to be an oversimplification. Schiller and Weinert
(2018) analyze different degrees of competition between advisors, since consumers’ demand for advice
is usually also not perfectly elastic due to personal connections and trust in an advisor. However, for
our analysis, competition between advisors is of minor importance. We comment on the assumption of
a monopolistic advisor market at the end of section 4.3.
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dividual consumer’s needs. In line with Schiller and Weinert (2018), we assume that
advisors have superior knowledge about available products and thus can judge more
accurately which products best suits consumers’ needs than consumers themselves. The
advisor cannot observe Θ = A,B directly, but possesses private information with respect
to the probability of a matching product, denoted by q = Pr (Θ = A). We assume, that
product A matches consumers’ characteristics with higher probability than product B
and thus refer to product A as a standard product and product B as a specialized prod-
uct. In particular, we assume that q is distributed according to a commonly known
distribution function G(q) with differentiable density g(q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1] and fur-
thermore stipulate that ∂g(q)∂q > 0 holds over q ∈ [0, 1]. The latter assumption allows
us to capture different match probabilities of the standard and the specialized product
with consumers’ characteristics in a flexible way.
The advisor’s only compensation is an upfront fee f paid by consumers, since we
assume commissions paid by product providers to be effectively banned by regulation.
If a consumer accepts the advisor’s offer, the advisor gives a product recommendation
r = A,B to the consumer, dependent on his private information q. However, giving
a product recommendation to the consumer is costly for the advisor, since he has to
persuade consumers of the corresponding products. Thereby, persuasion costs depend on
two factors. First, on consumers’ ex ante belief G(q) about the suitability of products.
As in Schiller and Weinert (2018), we assume that this factor of persuasion costs is
inversely proportional to the strength of consumers’ common prior belief about the
probability that a product matches their needs. Second, on product providers’ expenses
on marketing for their products. In particular, the advisor incurs persuasion costs of
cA(mA) =
(∫ 1
2
0
g(q)dq
)
k(mA) = G
(
1
2
)
k(mA) (4.1)
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for recommending product A and
cB(mB) =
(∫ 1
1
2
g(q)dq
)
k(mB) =
(
1−G
(
1
2
))
k(mB) (4.2)
for recommending product B, where k(mi) > 0 denotes the marginal persuasion costs for
the advisor dependent on the marketing expenses of product provider i = A,B. Thus,
product providers are able to affect the advisor’s marginal persuasion costs for their
product dependent on their expenses on marketing measures. In the sense of Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) and Stahl II (1994), we assume that advertising has a beneficial effect
for consumers, since it provides them with information about product characteristics.
However, in markets with complex products, consumers are not able to judge whether
a product suits their needs, even if they know product characteristics. Thus, in our
model, advertising has an indirect beneficial effect on consumers, since it lowers the
advisor’s persuasion costs for the advertised product. In line with Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) we assume a decreasing marginal effect of marketing expenses on the marginal
persuasion costs, that is, we assume k to be a convex function of mi with
∂k(mi)
∂mi
< 0
and ∂
2k(mi)
∂m2i
> 0 for i = A,B and furthermore, that k is a bounded function with upper
limit k¯ = k(0) and lower limit k = limmi→∞ k(mi) > 0. We do not differentiate in our
analysis between different marketing measures targeting consumers, like advertising in
newspaper, social media marketing or advertising on television. However, we assume,
that all marketing channels have the same effect, namely, that product marketing reduces
the cost of persuading a consumer of the corresponding product, due to the following
reasons: If a product is advertised, it is easier for the advisor to catch phrases or facts
regarding the corresponding product, since these are in mind of consumers due to the
presence in media. Furthermore, an advisor can target exactly his persuading talk to
consumers by highlighting facts of the product, that are already in consumers’ mind
due to the marketing measures of product providers. Even though, our analysis focuses
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on informative advertising, our model is also applicable to persuasive advertising, since
such sort of advertising may also lower persuasion costs for the advisor.
Following Schiller and Weinert (2018), it is straightforward, that cA(0) < cB(0) holds.
This shows, that in the absence of any marketing measures, it is less costly for the advisor
to persuade a consumer of the standard product A in comparison to the specialized
product B, due to the skewness of the common information about product suitability
g(q). Besides these driving factors for the advisor to give a product recommendation,
we assume, that he incurs a penalty payment d > 0 imposed by a regulator in the case,
that the recommended product does not match the consumer’s characteristics Θ.21
In our model, the advisor’s marginal persuasion cost function k(·), his potential
penalty costs for a wrong product recommendation d, the distribution of the advisor’s
private information G(q) and the derived utility levels vh and vl for the consumer are
exogenously given. Thus minimum expected costs for giving a product recommendation
for the advisor, dependent on q, mA and mB are given by
c(q,mA,mB) = min {(1− q)d+ cA(mA); qd+ cB(mB)} . (4.3)
A consumer’s expected payoff from purchasing product A, dependent on the proba-
bility q, that a consumer is of type A, is given by
vA(q) = q · vh + (1− q) · vl (4.4)
and from purchasing product B
vB(q) = (1− q) · vh + q · vl, (4.5)
21Other sources of advisor’s disutility subsequently of an unsuitable product recommendations can
also be reputational costs and thus forgone future businesses or professional concerns for the consumers’
well-being (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a).
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respectively. In order to focus on financial markets, where advice is essential for con-
sumers, we assume for consumers’ expected payoff without advice
E [vA (q)] =
∫ 1
0
vA(q)g(q)dq < 0 (4.6)
which implies E [vB (q)] =
∫ 1
0 vB(q)g(q)dq < 0, due to the skewness of g(q). As a
consequence, assumption (4.6) ensures, that it is not beneficial for consumers to purchase
any product without (informative) advice. Furthermore, we stipulate that
(
q, q¯
) ⊂ (0, 1)
exists with
G (qˆ)E [vB (q) | q < qˆ] + (1−G (qˆ))E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ] > E [c(q, 0, 0)] , (4.7)
for all qˆ ∈ (q, q¯), where E [c(q, 0, 0)] denotes the advisor’s minimized expected costs
for giving a product recommendation if marketing expenses of both product providers
are equal to zero. This assumption guarantees, that the expected value of advice for
consumers exceeds the advisor’s expected costs for giving a product recommendation
if advice is sufficiently informative and consequently a market for financial advice can
exist.
Throughout our analysis we assume consumers to be aware of the advisor’s trade-
off between recommending standard product and specialized product, that is, d, G(q)
and k(·), are common knowledge. However, marketing expenses are not disclosed to
consumers, whereas the advisor is able to infer these indirectly through his marginal
persuasion cost function k(mi), i = A,B. We model the interaction between the three
players by the following game. At stage 1, product providers simultaneously set their
product prices pA and pB and subsequently their marketing expenses mA and mB. At
stage 2, the advisor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer f for his product recommendation
service. At stage 3, consumers decide, whether to remain without advice or to engage
in the advisor’s offering. In the first case, the game continues at stage 5, otherwise,
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at stage 4, the advisors gives his product recommendation r = A,B to his consumer
and incurs the corresponding persuasion costs. At stage 5 consumers make their final
purchase decision and all payoffs are realized. For sake of simplicity, we do not discount
payoffs in our analysis.
4.3 Equilibrium analysis
In line with Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a), we consider perfect Bayesian equilibria with
some restrictions. We only consider pure strategy equilibria with sufficiently informa-
tive advice at stage 4. Such an equilibrium always exists by assumption (4.7), although
off-equilibrium marketing expenses and thereto resulting advice may be not sufficiently
informative so that a market for financial advice may exist. However, product providers
are not able to sell their products directly to consumers by assumption (4.6). Con-
sequently, in equilibria, where products are sold, advice is sufficiently informative for
consumers, in order to generate profits for product providers. Also in line with Inderst
and Ottaviani (2012a), we specify passive beliefs for consumers. Hence, consumers do
not react to observed price changes by changing their expectations about marketing
expenses of product providers. As a consequence, in any equilibrium, consumers hold
(point) beliefs mˆi, i = A,B about the respective marketing expenses.
When the advisor gives his product recommendation, product providers’ marketing
expenses mA and mB as well as the fee f are already determined. Following Schiller
and Weinert (2018), the advisor’s dominant strategy is to minimize his expected costs
which he incurs for giving a product recommendation after receiving his upfront payment
f . Explicitly, recommending the standard product A goes in hand with less expected
costs than those, for recommending the specialized product B if (1 − q)d + cA(mA) ≤
qd+cB(mB) holds. Hence, we derive a threshold q
∗ for which the advisor is better off by
recommending product A if for his private information q ≥ q∗ holds and recommending
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product B otherwise, where
q∗ :=

0 for 12 −
(1−G( 12))k(mB)
2d +
G( 12)k(mA)
2d ≤ 0
1
2 −
(1−G( 12))k(mB)
2d +
G( 12)k(mA)
2d for 0 <
1
2 −
(1−G( 12))k(mB)
2d +
G( 12)k(mA)
2d < 1
1 for 12 −
(1−G( 12))k(mB)
2d +
G( 12)k(mA)
2d ≥ 1.
(4.8)
The advisor minimizes his expected costs for recommending a product by two factors.
First, potential penalty payments for unsuitable product recommendations, given by
(1 − q)d for recommending product A and qd for recommending product B. Second,
persuasion costs cA(mA) and cB(mB) for recommending product A and B, respectively.
It is straight forward, that product providers are able to steer advice through their
marketing expenses since,
∂ci(mi)
∂mi
< 0 (4.9)
holds, for i = A,B.
We assume, that consumers are aware of the advisor’s incentive issue and of the fact,
that product providers may spend money on marketing measures, which may influence
the advisor’s cost of persuasion. However, marketing expenses are not disclosed to
consumers. As a consequence, wary consumers form rational expectations about these
expenses, denoted with mˆA and mˆB. By plugging these expectations into (4.8), they
derive an expected threshold qˆ∗ for the advisor to recommend product A if q ≥ qˆ∗ holds
and product B otherwise. In order to solve the game described, we start by analyzing
sequential rationality for a given expected cutoff qˆ∗ ∈ (0, 1).22
Beginning at stage 5 of the game, the final purchase decision, we have to differenti-
22For qˆ∗ = 0 or qˆ∗ = 1 consumers expect that advice is completely uninformative and thus do not
request advice by assumption (4.6)
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ate between consumers who requested advice at stage 3 and consumers who remained
without advice. In the latter case, the purchase decision is straight forward given by
(4.6) with no purchase at all. Those consumers who requested advice at stage 3, receive
the advisors product recommendation by r = A,B at stage 4. For r = A, the consumer
reevaluates the two products, given his belief qˆ∗ by
E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗] =
∫ 1
qˆ∗
vA(q)
g(q)
1−G(qˆ∗)dq
>
∫ 1
qˆ∗
vB(q)
g(q)
1−G(qˆ∗)dq = E [vB (q) | q ≥ qˆ
∗] , (4.10)
and for r = B by
E [vB (q) | q < qˆ∗] =
∫ qˆ∗
0
vB(q)
g(q)
G(qˆ∗)
dq
>
∫ qˆ∗
0
vA(q)
g(q)
G(qˆ∗)
dq = E [vA (q) | q < qˆ∗] . (4.11)
Strict inequalities thereby follow from the left skewed density g(q). Consequently, con-
sumers follow the advisor’s product recommendation, if ex post valuations are weakly
higher than the respective product prices pA and pB. Otherwise, consumers do not
purchase any product.
At stage 4, the advisor gives his product recommendation according to his dominant
strategy given by (4.8): For q ≥ q∗, he gives a product recommendation r = A and for
q < q∗ he gives a product recommendation r = B.
At stage 3, consumers can either stay without advice and continue the game at stage
5 or request advice for a fee f . In the case, that advice is requested, consumers expect
to receive the product recommendation r = A with probability 1 − G (qˆ∗) and r = B
with probability G (qˆ∗). Thus, their expected payoff for requesting advice equals their
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maximum willingness to pay for advice for a given expected cutoff qˆ∗ and is given by
f (qˆ∗) = G(qˆ∗) (E [vB (q) | q < qˆ∗]− pB)+(1−G(qˆ∗)) (E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗]− pA) . (4.12)
At stage 2, marketing expenses of both product providers are already determined.
The advisor makes his take-it-or-leave-it-offer according to consumers’ participation con-
straint (4.12) and his own participation constraint dependent on marketing expenses mA
and mB given by
f −
∫ 1
0
c(q,mA,mB)g(q)dq = f − E [c(q,mA,mB)] ≥ 0 (4.13)
or equivalently
f ≥ E [c(q,mA,mB)] . (4.14)
At stage 1, product providers first set their respective product prices pA and pB and
subsequently their respective marketing expenses mA and mB. Corresponding expected
payoffs are given by
piA = pA(1−G(q∗))−mA (4.15)
and
piB = pBG(q
∗)−mB, (4.16)
respectively. It is straightforward, that the fraction of consumers who are assigned
to each product provider by the advisor is affected by the true cutoff q∗. Although,
q∗ does not affect product providers’ product prices directly, in equilibrium, it affects
consumers’ willingness to pay for advice and consequently the rent that can be extracted
from consumers who accept the advisor’s offer.
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Differentiating expected payoffs yields
∂piA
∂mA
= pAg(q
∗)
(
−G
(
1
2
) ∂k(mA)
∂mA
2d
)
− 1 (4.17)
and
∂piB
∂mB
= pBg(q
∗)
(
−
(
1−G (12)) ∂k(mB)∂mB
2d
)
− 1. (4.18)
Thus, we derive first order conditions for optimal marketing expenses for both product
providers by
∂k (mA)
∂mA
=
−2d
pAg(q∗)G
(
1
2
) (4.19)
and
∂k (mB)
∂mB
=
−2d
pBg(q∗)
(
1−G (12)) . (4.20)
These conditions yield unique solutions for the optimal marketing expenses mA and mB,
since g(q) is an upward sloping function of q, k(mi) is a convex function of mi, i = A,B
and prices pA and pB are already fixed at this time.
Product providers anticipate consumers’ ex post valuation with advice of their prod-
ucts and anticipate that without advice, no products are sold. Thus, they need to
satisfy the advisor’s participation constraint and set their respective prices with optimal
marketing expenses for a given cutoff qˆ∗ by
pA(qˆ
∗) =
∫ 1
qˆ∗
vA(q)
g(q)
1−G(qˆ∗)dq −
∫ 1
0
c(q,mA,mB)g(q)dq
= E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗]− E [c(q,mA,mB)] (4.21)
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and
pB(qˆ
∗) =
∫ qˆ∗
0
vB(q)
g(q)
G(qˆ∗)
dq −
∫ 1
0
c(q,mA,mB)g(q)dq
= E [vB (q) | q < qˆ∗]− E [c(q,mA,mB)] . (4.22)
Consumers’ beliefs are passive, thus setting a price below pi(qˆ
∗), i = A,B is suboptimal
for the corresponding product providers. Due to the skewness of g(q), the optimal
product price pA(qˆ
∗) is decreasing with a decrease in the expected cutoff qˆ∗. If a consumer
is pretty sure, that product A matches his characteristics, that is, he has a high expected
cutoff qˆ∗, he is relatively sure to derive a high utility vh and thus has a high willingness
to pay for this product. However, if this cutoff is decreasing, he finds himself mixed in
a pool with other consumers, for whom product A is less likely to match. Since he is
not able to get more precise information about his match probability, he incorporates
possible low utilities for mismatching with a certain probability in his willingness to
pay. The same phenomenon analogously holds for pB(qˆ
∗), which is decreasing with an
increase in the expected cutoff qˆ∗.
Proposition 4.1 There exists a unique equilibrium with sufficiently informative advice,
i.e. q∗ ∈ (q, q¯), where the advisor charges a fee f = E [c(q,mA,mB)], consumers accept
this offer and purchase the recommended product. Product provider’s marketing expenses
are strictly positive, if the marginal effect on persuasion costs in the absence of marketing
measures is below a (negative) threshold k∗ (d, pi), i = A,B. This threshold is decreasing
with an increase in the advisor’s potential penalty d and increasing with an increase in
product prices pi, i = A,B.
Proposition 4.1 states, that in equilibrium with sufficiently informative advice, con-
sumers accept the advisor’s offer and follow his advice. Marketing measures are used
by product providers in order to steer the advisor’s product recommendation, if the
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decreasing effect on the advisor’s persuasion costs is sufficiently large. The decision of
product provider, to engage in marketing thereby depends on two crucial factors. First,
the advisor’s potential penalty payment d in case of an unsuitable product recommen-
dation. Intuitively, a higher penalty payment reduces the efficiency of marketing, since
the advisor is then less sensitive to a change in persuasion costs. Second, product prices
and consequently margins for product providers. If product prices are high, product
providers have room to engage in marketing, and consequently pushing sales. We ana-
lyze these effects in detail in the following section.
Another result of Proposition 4.1 is, that in equilibrium, a monopolistic advisor
possesses zero expected profit. This result is driven by the fact, that product providers
set their respective product prices in advance of the advisor’s offer for his advice service.
This game sequence is reasonable, since a product provider can launch a product in a
market with a respective price before an advisor decides whether to recommend this
product or not. Otherwise, an advisor would decide to recommend a specific product
although it is unclear whether some product provider actually decides to launch this
product or not. As a consequence, in a duopoly, product providers extract the whole
rent from consumers and the participation constraint is binding for the advisor. Hence,
this equilibrium outcome holds for any degree of competition in the sense of Schiller and
Weinert (2018).
4.4 Policy Implications
In this section, we assume, that marketing measures are sufficiently effective, so that by
Proposition 4.1, marketing expenses of both product providers are positive in equilib-
rium. However, optimal marketing expenses derived by (4.19) and (4.20) of both product
providers depend on different driving factors. Product providers’ profits (4.17) and (4.18)
directly depend on the advisor’s cutoff q∗. Thus a product provider has a greater incen-
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tive to raise marketing expenses in comparison to his competitor if the marginal effect of
his marketing expenses on q∗ is larger than that of his competitor. Marketing measures
of a product provider target the fraction of consumers who belief, that the competitor’s
product best suits their needs rather than those who already belief that the promoted
product is the best fit. Since the standard product A matches consumers’ characteristics
with higher probability than the specialized product B, marketing measures of product
provider B are targeting a greater fraction of consumers than those of product provider
A. Consequently product provider B’s marketing measures have a greater effect on q∗
than those of product provider A. Analytically this effect follows from
1−G
(
1
2
)
> G
(
1
2
)
⇔
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1−G (12)) ∂k(mB)∂mB
2d
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣G
(
1
2
) ∂k(mA)
∂mA
2d
∣∣∣∣∣⇔
∣∣∣∣ ∂q∗∂mB
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣ ∂q∗∂mA
∣∣∣∣
(4.23)
Furthermore, product providers’ incentives to engage in marketing are higher if the
corresponding margins are higher. In our model margins and product prices are treated
similarly, since production costs are normalized to zero by assumption. The advisor’s
marginal persuasion costs k(mi) are a downward sloping convex function of mi, i = A,B.
Thus, from first order conditions (4.19) and (4.20) it follows that a higher product price
results in a less negative first derivative (or in absolute terms a less steeper slope) of
persuasion costs at optimal marketing expenses which implies, due to the curvature of
k(mi), higher optimal marketing expenses. This reflects the tradeoff between pushing
sales and reducing the margin or intuitively the tradeoff between price and quantity in
classical oligopoly theory.
Comparing product providers’ optimal marketing expenses, ∂k(mA)∂mA <
∂k(mB)
∂mB
implies
mB > mA. Given that product prices are set according to (4.21) and (4.22) with pA(qˆ
∗)
and pB(qˆ
∗) respectively, ∂k(mA)∂mA <
∂k(mB)
∂mB
is equivalent to
E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗]G
(
1
2
)
< E [vB (q) | q < qˆ∗]
(
1−G
(
1
2
))
(4.24)
86
This inequality holds obviously if E [vA (q) | q ≥ qˆ∗] < E [vB (q) | q < qˆ∗], since G
(
1
2
)
<
1 − G (12) holds due to the left-skewed density g(q). However, for cutoff qˆ∗ = 12 , it
holds E
[
vA (q) | q ≥ 12
]
> E
[
vB (q) | q < 12
]
due to the higher fraction of consumers, for
whom the standard product A matches their needs with higher probability in comparison
to the specialized product B. Conditional expected product valuations are continuous
functions of the anticipated cutoff qˆ∗. Thus for a sufficiently small δ (vh, vl) > 0, for
which 1− 2G (12) < δ (vh, vl) holds, we can find an  > 0, such that
E
[
vA (q) | q ≥ 1
2
− 
]
G
(
1
2
)
> E
[
vB (q) | q < 1
2
− 
](
1−G
(
1
2
))
(4.25)
holds.23 In this case, product provider A can use his advantage from ex ante information,
in particular, that his product matches consumers’ needs with higher probability in
comparison to his competitor’s product, to set a higher price than product provider
B and thus possesses a higher margin. As described before, this results in a higher
incentive for product provider A to engage in marketing and consequently steer advice in
comparison to product provider B. This higher margin then outweighs product provider
B’s advantage to engage in marketing due to the higher marginal fraction of consumers
he can steer towards himself due to the skewness of ex ante information g(q).
Besides these effects, marketing expenses are also strategic complements for both
product providers. For given marketing expenses mi, product providers optimally set
their product prices pi(q
∗), i = A,B, in equilibrium. Suppose, product provider A raises
his marketing expenses mA. Since this decreases the advisor’s costs for recommending
product A, given by (4.9), the threshold q∗ given by (4.8) also decreases. In equilibrium,
consumers’ belief equals the true cutoff, qˆ∗ = q∗. Thus, consumers’ conditional product
valuations, given by (4.10) and (4.11), increases for product B and decreases for product
23If consumers’ utility difference between matching and unmatching product, vh − vl is sufficiently
high, it holds δ (vh, vl) ≥ 1. In this case, 1 − 2G
(
1
2
)
< δ (vh, vl) holds for any probability distribution
with a left-skewed density.
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A. This is due to the lower fraction of consumers, who are matched with product B and
consequently posses a high probability that product B is indeed the best suiting product.
Thus, product provider B can adjust his product price to the higher conditional product
valuation of consumers and consequently possesses a higher margin and therefore a higher
incentive to engage in marketing due to the raise in product provider A’s marketing
expenses. Analogous considerations hold for a raise in product provider B’s marketing
expenses and the corresponding response of product provider A.
All the aforementioned incentives for product providers to raise marketing expenses
are dependent on the advisor’s concern for giving unsuitable product recommendations.
Precisely, if the penalty d that the advisor incurs subsequently of an unsuitable product
recommendation is high, optimal marketing expenses given by (4.19) and (4.20) are low,
since these are inversely proportional to d. Analogous, a low penalty d, results in high
optimal marketing expenses. Intuitively, this effect can be explained by the following
two reasons. First, a low penalty d induces the advisor to become more responsive to
marketing expenses, that is, the absolute effect of mi on q
∗ is higher for i = A,B. Second,
the competitor’s raise in his marketing expenses due to the higher responsiveness of the
advisor to these has an additional feedback effect on a product provider to raise his own
marketing expenses as a strategic complementary answer to the competitor’s raise in
marketing expenses.
Proposition 4.2 There exists a threshold for the advisor’s penalty in case of an unsuit-
able product recommendation. If the actual penalty is below (above) this threshold, the
specialized product provider B exhibits in equilibrium higher (lower) marketing expenses
than the standard product provider A. If the actual penalty is equal to this threshold,
marketing expenses of both product providers are equal.
Proposition 4.2 states, that the extend to which product providers engage in mar-
keting crucially depends on the advisor’s potential penalty payment subsequently of an
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unsuitable product recommendation. In case of a low potential penalty, the specialized
product provider B exhibits higher marketing expenses in comparison to the standard
product provider A. Considering signs, from (4.23), it follows immediately, that in this
case, q∗ is higher in comparison to a case without any marketing measures of both
product providers. Hence, marketing measures can serve as a channel for competition
between product providers and increase matching of consumers and products. This is
due to the fact, that the specialized product provider B has two advantages in competing
through marketing with the standard product provider A. On the one hand, the special-
ized product provider’s marketing measures are targeting a greater audience than those
of his competitor and thus are more effective to steer advice. On the other hand, the
small fraction of consumers who receive the advice to purchase the specialized product
are pretty sure that this product best suits their needs, since no consumer whose best
suitable product is the standard product gets this recommendation, whereas consumers
who receive the recommendation to purchase the standard product are pooled with con-
sumers for whom this is not the best suitable product. Hence, the specialized product
provider is able to charge a higher price for his product and consequently possesses a
higher margin due to the higher consumers’ willingness to pay for the specialized prod-
uct in comparison to the willingness to pay for the standard product. This gives the
specialized product provider an advantage to raise marketing expenses. However, if the
advisor is exposed to a high penalty payment, the standard product provider A exhibits
higher optimal marketing expenses in comparison to the specialized product provider B.
In this case, regulation may backfire with respect to consumer matching with products,
since in the scenario of (4.25) consumer matching may be worse if product providers
engage in marketing in comparison to the case without any marketing.
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4.5 Conclusions
In this article, we provide a normative framework to analyze competition between prod-
uct providers where commissions are banned but consumers can only be reached through
an advisor. Our model indicates, that in markets with sufficiently differentiated products
it is not beneficial for product providers to compete through respective product prices.
However, if advisors face transaction costs for persuading consumers of a product, prod-
uct providers may compete indirectly through marketing channels in order to influence
the advisor’s product recommendation. Whether marketing measures may serve as a
competitive tool for product providers crucially depends on its effectiveness. If the effec-
tiveness is sufficiently high, the extend to which product providers engage in marketing
depends on various factors. If the advisor has to fear a high penalty subsequently of
an unsuitable product recommendation, both product providers exhibit low expenses on
marketing measures and vice versa. However, a high margin pushes expenses for market-
ing measures for both product providers. Additionally, a product provider has a greater
incentive to engage in marketing if his competitor possesses high expenses in marketing
measures, since these can serve as a strategic tool for competition. Comparatively, there
arises different incentives for product providers to engage in marketing dependent on
their market share. Especially, if one product provider possesses only a small market
share in comparison to his competitor, his incentives to engage in marketing are higher,
since he can reach a higher fraction of consumers with marketing measures, in compari-
son to his competitor. Hence, a small product provider extends his market share through
marketing measures and possesses in equilibrium a higher market share in comparison
to a scenario without any marketing.
As a consequence, marketing measures may not only serve as a competitive tool for
product providers, but may also improve matching of products and consumers. This
leaves the question open for future research, whether this is desirable from a welfare
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perspective, especially in comparison to a commission based remuneration system for
advisors. If marketing measures are used as a strategic tool, but have a decreasing
marginal effect, our model indicates, that there will be an oversupply of marketing ex-
penses in equilibrium compared to the welfare maximizing level. Commissions may also
serve as a competitive tool for product providers, but at the same time also compen-
sates the advisor. Therefore, commissions may serve for the same purpose as marketing
expenses, but from a welfare perspective, commissions can be seen as transfers rather
than costs. Consequently, the effectiveness of marketing measures will play a key role in
a welfare analysis.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Uniqueness of product providers’ best responses resulting
from (4.19) and (4.20) and the fact, that they intersect at most once, follows from
∂g(q∗)
∂q∗ > 0,
∂pA(qˆ
∗)
∂qˆ∗ > 0 and
∂pB(qˆ
∗)
∂qˆ∗ < 0. Given that prices are optimally set according to
(4.21) and (4.22), strategic complementary of marketing expenses mi, i = A,B follows
from
∂ ∂k(mA)∂mA
∂mB
=
∂ −2d
pAg(q∗)G( 12)
∂mB
=
∂g(q∗)
∂q∗
(
1−G (12)) ∂k(mB)∂mB
pA(qˆ∗)G
(
1
2
)
(g(q∗))2
< 0 (4.26)
and
∂ ∂k(mB)∂mB
∂mA
=
∂ −2d
pBg(q∗)(1−G( 12))
∂mA
=
∂g(q∗)
∂q∗ G
(
1
2
) ∂k(mA)
∂mA
pB(qˆ∗)
(
1−G (12)) (g(q∗))2 < 0 (4.27)
with ∂k(mi)∂mi < 0 and
∂2k(mi)
∂m2i
> 0 for i = A,B. Uniqueness of equilibrium follows from
consistency of beliefs, that is, qˆ∗ = q∗ and from (4.7).
Given equilibrium prices with pA(q
∗) and pB(q∗), differentiating product providers’
profits and evaluating at mi = 0, i = A,B yields
∂piA
∂mA
∣∣∣∣
mA=0
= pA(q
∗)g(q∗)
−G
(
1
2
)
∂k
∂mA
∣∣∣
mA=0
2d
− 1 (4.28)
and
∂piB
∂mB
∣∣∣∣
mB=0
= pB(q
∗)g(q∗)
−
(
1−G (12)) ∂k∂mB ∣∣∣mB=0
2d
− 1. (4.29)
If (4.28) and (4.29) are strictly positive, marketing expenses of product providers A and
B, respectively, are strictly positive. Beginning with product provider A, ∂piA∂mA
∣∣∣
mA=0
> 0
is equivalent to
∂k
∂mA
∣∣∣∣
mA=0
<
−2d
pA(q∗)g(q∗)G
(
1
2
) = k∗(d, pA(q∗)). (4.30)
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Given, that marketing expenses are strictly positive, it holds pA(q
∗) > 0 in equilibrium,
since marketing expenses are paid by earnings through a strictly positive product price.
Consequently, it holds
pA(q
∗)g(q∗)G
(
1
2
)
> 0. (4.31)
Thus, for equilibrium prices, it holds
∂k∗(d, pA(q∗))
∂d
=
−2
pA(q∗)g(q∗)G
(
1
2
) < 0 (4.32)
and
∂k∗(d, pA(q∗))
∂pA(q∗)
=
2d
pA(q∗)2g(q∗)G
(
1
2
) > 0. (4.33)
Analogous, ∂piB∂mB
∣∣∣
mB=0
> 0 is equivalent to
∂k
∂mB
∣∣∣∣
mB=0
<
−2d
pB(q∗)g(q∗)
(
1−G (12)) = k∗(d, pB(q∗)). (4.34)
and analogous to (4.31) it holds
pB(q
∗)g(q∗)
(
1−G
(
1
2
))
> 0. (4.35)
Hence, also ∂k
∗(d,pA(q∗))
∂d < 0 and
∂k∗(d,pA(q∗))
∂pA(q∗)
> 0 holds. The remaining assertions are
shown by the backward analysis in section 4.3, using qˆ∗ = q∗ in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. As a composition of continuous functions, q∗ is a con-
tinuous function of d. From (4.8) it follows limd→∞ q∗ = 12 irrespective of both product
providers’ marketing expenses. Thus, (4.25) implies, that optimal marketing expenses,
characterized by (4.19) and (4.20) are higher for product provider A in comparison to
product provider B, if the penalty d is sufficiently high.
For mA = mB = 0, (4.8) directly implies limd→0 q∗|mA=mB=0 = 0. However, optimal
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marketing expenses, characterized by (4.19) and (4.20) depend crucially on product
prices, since a higher margin leads to higher optimal marketing expenses. Considering
equilibrium prices, pA(q
∗) < pB(q∗) holds, if E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗] < E [vB (q) | q < q∗]
holds. L’Hoˆpital’s rule yields
lim
q∗→0
E [vB (q) | q < q∗] = lim
q∗→0
∫ q∗
0
vB(q)
g(q)
G(q∗)
dq = lim
q∗→0
vB(q
∗)g(q∗)
g(q∗) = vh (4.36)
whereas (4.6) implies limq∗→0E [vA (q) | q ≥ q∗] < 0. Hence, for a sufficiently small
penalty d, product providerB charges in equilibrium a higher price than product provider
A. Since G
(
1
2
)
< 1−G (12), (4.19) and (4.20) imply, that in this case, product provider
B’s marketing expenses are strictly higher than those of product provider A. Continuity
of q∗ implies then the existence of a penalty d∗ for which marketing expenses of both
product providers are equal. Considering the first derivative of q∗ at this point yields
∂q∗
∂d
∣∣∣∣
d=d∗
=
(
1− 2G (12)) k(mA)
2d2
> 0. (4.37)
Thus, for given optimal marketing expenses mA = mB, a marginal decrease in d leads to
a decrease in q∗. However, in equilibrium, optimal marketing expenses are adjusted to q∗
and are driven by optimal product prices pA(q
∗) and pB(q∗). Since, conditional product
valuations are always higher than marginal valuations, i.e. E [vB (q) | q < q∗] > vB(q∗)
and E [vB (q) | q < q∗] > vB(q∗)holds, ∂g(q)∂q > 0 implies an increase in product provider
B’s optimal product price in equilibrium pB(q
∗) and a decrease in product provider A’s
optimal product price in equilibrium pA(q
∗) with a decrease in q∗ and vice versa. Thus,
for d < d∗, optimal marketing expenses (4.19) and (4.20) are higher for product provider
B in comparison to product provider A and for d > d∗ optimal marketing expenses are
higher for product provider A in comparison to product provider B. As a consequence,
d∗ is unique.
94
Chapter 5
General Conclusions
Many consumers seek advice when making important purchase decisions for complex
financial products like mortgages, retirement savings or life insurance. Thus, the quality
of advice has a large impact on consumers’ wealth, especially in the retirement age.
Various policy interventions aim at preventing consumers from inadequate advice. In
particular, the compensation of financial advisors is subject to intense discussions. This
dissertation contributes to the literature by theoretically analyzing effects of fee-based
and commission-based remuneration systems in markets for financial advice.
To this end, chapter 2 aims at making reasonable assumptions about consumers and
financial advisors and at analyzing how these assumptions affect the advice process. In
particular, it is assumed that consumers demand for reasons and explanations, why a
particular product should suit their needs, when receiving a product recommendation.
As a consequence, advisors face transaction costs for recommending a product, since a
product cannot be simply recommended, but also, reasonable explanations for the prod-
uct selection have to be provided to consumers. These transaction costs are considered as
persuasion costs. The theoretical model shows, that advice might not be solely distorted
by commission payments, but also by these persuasion costs. Therefore, advice can also
be biased in the case, that the advisor is exclusively compensated by consumers. The
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extent to which advice is biased depends crucially on market shares of product providers
and on potential reputational costs for the advisor enforced by market discipline.
In chapter 3, quality of advice and total welfare are theoretically analyzed under fee-
based and commission-based remuneration systems. The benchmark model is similar
to that of chapter 2 and shows, that under a fee-based remuneration system, competi-
tion through product prices is not beneficial for product providers and consequently no
competition takes place in equilibrium. A modified model, where the advisor is compen-
sated by product providers via commission payments shows, that product providers have
different incentives to compete through commission payments in dependency of market
shares, consumers’ product valuations and potential reputational costs for the advisor.
If the difference of commission payments for different products is sufficiently small in
equilibrium, a commission-based remuneration system leads to a strictly higher total
welfare in comparison to a fee-based remuneration system due to a higher fraction of
consumers, who are matched with their best suitable product. Otherwise, total welfare
is higher under a fee-based remuneration system.
Chapter 4 considers competition between product providers in markets, where prod-
ucts cannot be sold directly to consumers and commission payments are banned by
regulation. The theoretical framework is based on chapter 2 and considers persuasion
costs in the advice process as a central assumption. It is analyzed, whether competi-
tion between product providers is possible through two channels: Competition through
product prices and competition through informative advertising. In line with chapter 3,
it is shown, that competition through product prices does not take place in equilibrium.
However, informative advertising may serve as a channel for competition between prod-
uct providers, if the effect of steering advice is sufficiently high. The intuition behind
is, that product providers may provide consumers with relevant product information,
so that the advisor faces lower persuasion costs for an advertised product. By this,
product providers are able to steer advice towards an advertised product. Analogous to
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commission payments, product providers’ incentives to engage in informative advertis-
ing depend on market shares, consumers’ product valuations and potential reputational
costs for the advisor. If market shares are uneven, consumers’ product valuations are
sufficiently high and potential reputational costs for the advisor are low, it is shown, that
competition through informative advertising leads to an increased fraction of consumers,
who are matched with their most suitable product.
In summary, this thesis provides detailed insides of an advice process and the affiliated
interaction of driving factors which influence the quality of advice. The underlying
analysis of this thesis shows, that a fee-based remuneration system for financial advisors
does not constitute a universal remedy for biased advice and total welfare losses in
the corresponding markets. Therefore, regulators should carefully consider, if a ban on
commission payments is a suitable tool for achieving unbiased advice. In some cases,
such a regulatory intervention may backfire and lead to a higher bias in advice and
as a consequence to a lower total welfare. Based on this thesis, future research could
address the impact of persuasion costs on further important steps in the advice process
like consumer canvassing, risk classification of consumers and the provision of these
information to product providers.
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